Sunday, May 27, 2012

Argument by Fiat -- Yet More on Faith and Peter Boghossian

In his aggressive public campaign against "faith", Peter Boghossian is back with another lecture on the topic titled Faith: Pretending to Know Things You Don't Know. For most people, I suggest reading the title of the lecture and allowing your feelings about it to determine whether it could be valuable for you to engage. If that is what you believe faith to be, then you may want to watch the lecture and explore some of the out-workings of this belief, while having your ego gently stroked. If you don't believe that is what faith is -- along with the vast majority of people who have ever used the term -- then there's no sense in watching the lecture because Peter offers no argument for this controversial conclusion, rather he assumes it to be true and declares it to be so by fiat.

Unless, like me, you have a somewhat masochistic streak or other reasons for which you wish to engage communities of un-faith, rest assured that the title tells the whole story and go along with your day. At the risk of losing some readers here, you probably need not even read this post any further, but if you want a more in depth explication of the reasons the presentation is entirely impotent, or if you have an inclination to defend it, then proceed.

I've already hinted at the problem with Peter's thesis, but let me expound more fully: A) That isn't what faith is. B) Peter never demonstrates that people of faith actually don't know what they "pretend to know"; it's a bald assertion. C) To the extent that it is most likely true of some or even many faith claims (due to, for example, the mutual exclusivity of the claims), this does not mean it is necessarily true of faith itself or for specific faiths. This, as in his previous lecture on the topic, commits the fallacy of division

In addition to his central definitional thesis, Boghossian also wants to attempt to divorce faith from its assumed alliance to morality. He thinks being a 'person of faith' tends to automatically bring up the association in many people's minds of strong moral character, while Peter thinks being a 'person of faith' is essentially neutral, in terms of morality. This seems to me mostly uncontroversial; most honest people of faith don't claim to be inherently morally superior simply because they have "faith". Christians, for instance, readily admit that sin infects the entire human race, including all Christians, and that they do nothing to merit their salvation from the consequences, reality, and dominion of sin but recieve salvation as an unmerited gift. But if Peter wants to divorce non-specific 'faith' (that is, faith-as-process, rather than faith-in-X) from the cultural linkage to morality, no thinking person of faith would be troubled by the agenda (since we have faith-in-X, not faith-in-faith-as-process).

Peter goes on in his lecture to address 5 common assertions people of faith make, such as "My faith is true for me", and substitutes his definition for "faith", for the word "faith", to yield "My pretending to know what I don't know is true for me". He seems to think this a potent move, but why? "My faith is true for me" is already silly in itself. Substituting the words of your silly definition compounds the silliness, to be sure, but it tells us nothing about the nature of faith. It only tells us that A) people of faith sometimes say dumb things and B) that you are baking your conclusion into your premises, producing a circular argument (if any).

Peter goes on to address people who, when attempting to defend the use of "faith", use the term when they really mean "hope". The difficulty here is what seems to be a prescriptivist naivety that believes words to be ontological entities with hard, fast, immobile meanings and vivid, necessary demarcations. But there's no hard distinction between "faith" and "hope"; faith isn't synonymous with hope, but hope is (usually) an element of what constitutes faith, at least for the Christian (and I assume many faiths). Faith makes knowledge claims, but that's not all it does. And you can't change this fact by fiat; if you think faith and hope should have some hard, impenetrable boundary between them, you must make the argument, and he doesn't attempt to. With that said, I'm sure people he engages with sometimes improperly invoke "faith" when they should invoke "hope", or vice versa, but so what? This also tells us nothing about the nature of faith. 

But perhaps, since he is presenting to a crowd of presumably like-minded individuals (the gathering is hosted by some sort of 'humanist' group), he wouldn't object to my characterization of him offering no arguments here. After all, in no uncertain terms, he makes it clear that the primary objective for the talk is, essentially, wholly propagandistic. That is, operating on the presumption that faith is necessarily void of content or value, what are productive rhetorical ways to create cultural and linguistic shifts that would serve to best spread this idea. If this is the case, there's nothing inherently wrong with holding meetings for PR purposes, but the lack of any underlying foundation for the ideas you're looking to propagate remains a glaring problem. 

Since these presentations couldn't possibly do anything to persuade a genuine, intelligent person of faith to abandon their faith, you might wonder why I bother responding to them. It's a good question and, frankly, there probably are much better uses of my time. But there are also those people who are not yet believers, as well as people (whether Christian already or not) who may not be diligent enough in their thinking to parse this stuff out, who may come in contact with the arguments and find the superficial rhetorical force of them to be persuasive. Of course, I'm under no delusion that my blog has enough readership to act as any hugely significant counterweight to this effect, but there still is some value in making sure such things don't go unresponded to.  

Peter recently accused me of never having anything nice to say about him, and he was completely right in his charge (I since attempted to rectify it by offering him a sincere compliment). To offer some further redress:  one good recommendation Peter had in his lecture is that we attempt to separate beliefs we find noxious from the people who hold them, and to, accordingly, respect people even as we attack their ideas. And that we ought to treat them how we want them to treat us. I do try to separate ideas from people, (or sin from sinner) and I harbor no personal ill will against Peter, I only take issue with his ideas. Per his recommendation, but more importantly per my Maker's command. 

11 comments:

  1. If I'm understanding "B)" above correctly, does he really need to prove that people of faith actually don't know what they pretend to know? Examples of this are quite ubiquitous. People don't actually know what is sinful in the eyes of God, or that God created the universe, or that God exists at all, yet they pretend that they do. He also doesn't prove that people of faith exist in the first place. Would you have him lay out the proof for that as well?

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  2. Steve, if you got past 'B' to 'C', you'd see that I address the fact that various faith claims being instances of 'pretending to know when you don't' doesn't mean that that is what faith *is*. So, yes, if he wants to not commit the fallacy, he has to understand the difference between what faith is in itself and a possible outcome of it.

    And, no, he doesn't know that people of faith don't in fact know the things that they claim to know, at least in the case of most kinds of faith claims. If God exists, it's entirely possible that a faith properly oriented can produce true beliefs w/ epistemic certainty. To say it's impossible or highly unlikely is to no more than to reiterate one's unbelief in other terms.

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  3. The purpose of the talk was not to make an argument. Rather, he proposed to explicate a term. Also, why didn't you answer his thought challenge?

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    1. What was the thought challenge again? I watched the whole thing, even took a few notes, but for whatever reason the thought challenge must not have struck me as significant/relevant.

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    2. The challenge was: Create a sentence wherein the word 'faith' cannot be replaced by the words 'I hope that', wherein you do not profess to know something which you do not actually know.

      The challenge merely goes to show that faith is just a way to either say you know something which you don't actually know, or say that you hope something is true.

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    3. Ah, yes. I think I ignored it because I addressed the faith/hope claim, making the challenge moot -- hope is not precisely synonymous with faith, and though people may use one when they ought use the other, when you say ”faith” you're saying something different. Any and EVERY instance where someone properly invokes ”faith” in a non-religious sense can't be replaced with ”hope” and retain the meaning.

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    4. To be more explicit: hope is a desire with no inherently ascribed expectation. You can hope for an outcome even while being aware it's a longshot (betting on a roullette number, for example). Faith (in one sense) is hope PLUS an expectation of outcome. If you have faith a particular roullette number will hit, it's naive and foolish, but you mean something different than ”hope”. If you have faith your brother will follow through on some commitment (a faith founded on the evidence of past reliability), it's different than mere hope -- hope you could have even if your brother was utterly unreliable. Replace ”faith” w/ ”hope” here and you're saying different things.

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  4. Great post--thank you Nathan. I don't think you are wasting your time.

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  5. What do you think that faith means Mr. Duffy?

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  6. ”The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” is how the Bible defines faith, which is the primary way I understand the term. In the ”non-religious” sense, you can consult a good (but not any) dictionary. But, as I've said elsewhere, it's a large protean reality, so attempting to precisely pin it down by a narrow definition is a quixotic task.

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