Showing posts with label abortion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label abortion. Show all posts
Monday, September 24, 2012
Teen Pregnancy, Sex-ed, and Smug Liberal Deception
As Ross Douthat has pointed out on Twitter, this piece by Amanda Marcotte is smugly and sloppily wrong. She flagrantly conflates teen pregnancy rates with teen birth rates, leading to a factual error in the title of her piece which subsequently mars her whole argument.
Douthat cites Guttmacher statistics from 2005 which show that the teen pregnancy rates of Mississippi and New York are effectively the same at 85/1000 and 77/1000, respectively. Marcotte cites statistics about the discrepancy in birth rates between the states as evidence in favor of her argument for liberal sex education. But if the supposed superiority of New York's sex education ethic with regard to birth control, condom use, and other preventative measures explained the discrepancy, then that would manifest itself as a difference in pregnancy rates. Yet there is no difference.
Clearly the missing variable between pregnancy and birth is the abortion rate. New York boasts the highest abortion rate in the country at 41/1000, while Mississippi's is 11/1000. Hence the discrepancy between teen birth rates and pregnancy rates. So it turns out what Amanda Marcotte is actually advocating is for "better" abortion education, not sex education.
The pregnancy rates being the same undermines her entire argument about liberal sex education being efficacious. The only resultant difference -- at least as measured by comparing these two particular states -- is in decisions that are made after sex. If you're the monstrous, pro-baby-killing sort, you might argue that New York teens make "better" decisions after sex and subsequent pregnancy; you can't argue that they do so beforehand. They don't.
Liberal sex education doesn't prevent teen pregnancy; it prevents teen pregnancies from becoming births. At most. Of course, the fact that more abortions reduce the number of live births isn't exactly revelatory information. Additionally, the divergent cultural values of the regions are a better candidate for the root cause of the differences in abortion rates, and these would largely remain even in the face of changes in sex education programs. The differences in the types of sex education are themselves epiphenomena of these more fundamental cultural differences. They are effects, not causes. Correlation is not causation.
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
On Todd Akin, 'Facts', and Demagoguery
Todd Akin, the Republican nominee for Senate in the state of Missouri, recently made some controversial statements. When asked about his stance on opposing abortion, even in cases of rape, he responded with the following:
As you might imagine, Akin has caught serious heat over the comments. It's predictable that he would catch flack from the media and Democratic politicians, but in the wake of the comments Akin has faced almost as much criticism from the Right, many of whom -- from Michelle Malkin to Jonah Goldberg to Ann Coulter to Mitt Romney -- are calling for him to step down. It's an open question what portion of the reaction from the Right is motivated by a genuine concern over Akin's fitness for office, and what amount is naked political calculation, though I suspect the vast majority of it is the latter.
I have a couple motivations for weighing in here: 1) The event is causing significant inter-conservative turmoil and friction in a way I haven't seen in quite a while, which I would like to attempt to soothe somewhat. 2) The large amount of unscientific pedantry and demagoguery being thrown Akin's way needs a riposte, and I don't see anyone else offering it.
There seem to be three elements of the issue worth discussing, and since they are being flagrantly conflated and confused by many, let me make some clear demarcations. There's the policy dimension i.e. Akin's proposal for no legal exceptions for rape in hypothetical anti-abortion legislation. There's the substance of his defense of his policy position. And lastly, there's the way he has gone about phrasing and framing his defense, and the tone that he's done it in. Of course, these all overlap and intersect to some degree (which I will also discuss), but too often one is addressing one aspect or the other, while another person is thinking about it on a different level, causing confusion.
Policy
While Akin's policy prescription is obviously scandalous to anyone on the Left, we can effectively bracket out their concerns because they don't merely object to the absence of an exception for abortion in cases of rape, they object to not having on-demand abortion for anyone, anywhere, any time and for any reason. Their objections are thus moot.
However, on this matter, even within the pro-life movement there is a diversity of opinion. Some support exceptions for rape and incest, others do not, and both have defensible, respectable cases for their position. And because we support a federalist solution to the problem, after Roe is hypothetically overturned, returning the issue to the states, we can accommodate a diversity of views on this side issue. Some states could draft anti-abortion legislation without exceptions for rape, and others could include exceptions. Therefore, Republicans and conservatives generally tolerate honest dissent on this secondary matter, while still remaining united on the primary issue of the 99% of abortions that aren't due to rape.
On Akin's policy stance, whatever division exists is easily accommodated in the conservative, Republican framework, and of course those on the Left hate it the same way they hate any restrictions on abortion. So the policy angle can't really be the fundamental issue here.
The Substance of Akin's Defense
This is where the dispute really lies. First, it's worth noting that Akin's most controversial remarks were prefatory, not his actual response to the question about his policy. His actual response to the question is that rapists should be punished for their heinous crime, not children. But since his prefatory remarks are the primary source of controversy, let's look at his claims (we'll get to the wording of his claims in the next section):
These are his fundamental claims. The first is uncontroversial; it's a fact that rape is sometimes falsely accused, and that some statutory rape laws are written so as to define certain sex acts as 'rape' that many would not consider it to be.
Half of the 2nd bullet point is also uncontroversial. It's a fact that rape takes place much less often than consensual sex, and that pregnancy from rape is itself rare, absolutely. However, if he meant that the frequency of pregnancy-cum-rape is rare compared to the frequency it occurs in consensual sex, per sex act, then the claim becomes controversial.
A much-cited 1996 study suggests that it isn't significantly more rare, in the latter sense. Though there are questions about the legitimacy of the conclusions of that study, as well as other factors that need to be considered, such as the fact that consensual sex has the feature of allowing for partners to practice pregnancy-prevention; rape has no such feature. Or that only 11.7% of the victims sought immediate medical attention, which leaves open a significant possibility of false allegations (or diagnoses) of rape. In any case, his use of 'rare' is certainly defensible and in no sense demonstrably false. Even on the study's chosen terms of per-sex-act rape-pregnancy of those raped who are age 12-47, 5% is still compatible with the descriptor 'rare'.
The amorphous character of these numbers -- and thus their meaninglessness -- is illustrated in contradictions between studies. Another article at Scientific American is being cited by some, purporting to be a corrective to Akin. In that article they cite DOJ statistics stating that "in 2004-2005, 64,080 women were raped." In the aforementioned 1996 survey, they put the number of rape pregnancies at 32,000 a year. Some quick math seems to suggest that in 2004-2005, 100% of women who got raped got pregnant from it. Given the manifold complications in studying the topic, such contradictions are not entirely inexplicable -- aforementioned ones, reported versus unreported rapes, forcible rape versus statutory rape, false allegations of rape etc. -- but then don't run around waving the sheets of statistics in your hand, claiming to have disproved Akin. You haven't.
The third bullet point is the real sticking point. If there is such a biological mechanism, it hasn't yet been identified clearly (although there are at least viable candidates). However, a biological mechanism has been identified that links increases in stress to a decrease in fertility. One need only make an inference to rape increasing stress and anxiety in order to link rape to a decrease female fertility. And given research on that topic, that seems a very reasonable inference. Not that this means that Akin is clearly, unquestionably correct in this aspect of his remarks, but he isn't obviously wrong either, contra the seething mass of demagogues.
The Framing of His Defense
No one questions this aspect of the critique of Akin. By just about everyone's reckoning, he screwed up badly here and on multiple levels. There are times to point out that certain charges of rape are illegitimate, but not here, not now, and not in this way. His use of "legitimate rape" wording was a big mistake. Further, his claim that the female body has something to "shut the whole thing down" is misleading and poorly worded, even if he is right. If there's any truth to the claim, it's that the stress and anxiety produced from a rape causes certain hormones that hinder reproduction to start producing excessively, and decrease the rate of conception by some factor. If you're going to get into that issue -- which is itself a bad political decision -- then at least be able to phrase your position in a more accurate, intelligent manner.
And, as a politician, he should have gone out of his way to cushion his remarks with disclaiming statements of care. Such as noting that some pregnancies do occur from rape (however rarely), and that such victims need care, and how he supports groups which offer victimized women alternatives and counseling. Or at least something along these lines. He spoke about rape and abortion and only really spoke about the rapist and the conceived child! Mostly treating the woman dismissively as a nonentity or an intermediary. This is quite careless and offensive, and definitely deserves criticism. He must make the point that, though there are competing interests, especially those of the victim, he still concludes that the life of the child supersede those interests.
He could have made substantially the same point in a different manner without giving anyone a legitimate reason to rebuke him, but on this level he failed utterly.
The Response
But enough about Akin. The response to his remark is much more interesting to me. On the Left, there has been predictable reaction: straw-manning Akin's argument (claiming Akin claimed rape can't cause pregnancy, which he never did); boiler-plate vitriolic hysteria; confused or disingenuous outrage; 'scientific' demagoguery. You know the drill.
On the Right, as I've noted above, there exists division. While many movement conservatives are pragmatically concerned about the gravity of this election cycle and thus want him to step down, others think that defending him -- to the extent possible -- is a matter of principle, either on the substance of the matter itself or in solidarity with our brothers in arms. While I'm obviously defending him, my sympathies are torn by these two completely legitimate concerns. What we absolutely should not do -- which a disturbing number of conservatives are doing -- is pile on, in one voice with the Left, denouncing Akin as ignorant or 'wrong'. Sure, criticize him for his carelessness, his callousness, or his failure as a politician. And if that carelessness seems likely to cost us a Senate seat, then advocate for him to step down, but don't pretend it was anything more than a gaffe.
The most obnoxious of all the responses have to be the pedants looking to 'fact-check' or 'refute' Akin's claims (such as The Atlantic and i09 pieces linked above). The only empirical or quasi-empirical claims he made are that A) rape pregnancies are rare (true) and B) that female biology makes conception less likely in rape victims by some degree (not demonstrably true, but not demonstrably false). If you read his statements in a manner that best suits your argument -- such as reading 'rare' to mean 'comparatively rare per sex act', rather than 'absolutely rare' -- then don't complain when I point out that there is nothing necessary about reading his comments in such a manner or that, even if you do, he still isn't necessarily wrong.
Generally, the response has been disappointingly emotional and reactionary across a wide swath of responders. What is there to get so upset about? It was already known that Republicans are Pro-life, so no novel developments on that count. It was similarly known that many Republicans oppose rape exceptions in theoretical abortion law, on coherent, morally serious grounds. Again, not news. The fact that a politician bungled a question, made dubious (but not false) empirical claims, and his indelicate and flippant response came off as calloused toward women? Fair game, but it's a back-page story at best. A politician's error is costing one party a likely Senate seat in a vitally important election year, and the other party is using it, not only to possibly win that particular Senate race, but as a tool to paint Republicans in general as anti-scientific, anti-woman, etc. and leverage this caricature for broad political advantage? Aha, now this is worth getting worked-up over, for those on all sides. And as long as we see it clearly for what it is, it's not a problem. Let's just be sure to harshly condemn those elements diabolically pretending it's about something else.
“It seems to me, from what I understand from doctors, that’s really rare. If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down. But let’s assume that maybe that didn’t work or something: I think there should be some punishment, but the punishment ought to be of the rapist, and not attacking the child.”
As you might imagine, Akin has caught serious heat over the comments. It's predictable that he would catch flack from the media and Democratic politicians, but in the wake of the comments Akin has faced almost as much criticism from the Right, many of whom -- from Michelle Malkin to Jonah Goldberg to Ann Coulter to Mitt Romney -- are calling for him to step down. It's an open question what portion of the reaction from the Right is motivated by a genuine concern over Akin's fitness for office, and what amount is naked political calculation, though I suspect the vast majority of it is the latter.
I have a couple motivations for weighing in here: 1) The event is causing significant inter-conservative turmoil and friction in a way I haven't seen in quite a while, which I would like to attempt to soothe somewhat. 2) The large amount of unscientific pedantry and demagoguery being thrown Akin's way needs a riposte, and I don't see anyone else offering it.
There seem to be three elements of the issue worth discussing, and since they are being flagrantly conflated and confused by many, let me make some clear demarcations. There's the policy dimension i.e. Akin's proposal for no legal exceptions for rape in hypothetical anti-abortion legislation. There's the substance of his defense of his policy position. And lastly, there's the way he has gone about phrasing and framing his defense, and the tone that he's done it in. Of course, these all overlap and intersect to some degree (which I will also discuss), but too often one is addressing one aspect or the other, while another person is thinking about it on a different level, causing confusion.
Policy
While Akin's policy prescription is obviously scandalous to anyone on the Left, we can effectively bracket out their concerns because they don't merely object to the absence of an exception for abortion in cases of rape, they object to not having on-demand abortion for anyone, anywhere, any time and for any reason. Their objections are thus moot.
However, on this matter, even within the pro-life movement there is a diversity of opinion. Some support exceptions for rape and incest, others do not, and both have defensible, respectable cases for their position. And because we support a federalist solution to the problem, after Roe is hypothetically overturned, returning the issue to the states, we can accommodate a diversity of views on this side issue. Some states could draft anti-abortion legislation without exceptions for rape, and others could include exceptions. Therefore, Republicans and conservatives generally tolerate honest dissent on this secondary matter, while still remaining united on the primary issue of the 99% of abortions that aren't due to rape.
On Akin's policy stance, whatever division exists is easily accommodated in the conservative, Republican framework, and of course those on the Left hate it the same way they hate any restrictions on abortion. So the policy angle can't really be the fundamental issue here.
The Substance of Akin's Defense
This is where the dispute really lies. First, it's worth noting that Akin's most controversial remarks were prefatory, not his actual response to the question about his policy. His actual response to the question is that rapists should be punished for their heinous crime, not children. But since his prefatory remarks are the primary source of controversy, let's look at his claims (we'll get to the wording of his claims in the next section):
- Rape is sometimes falsely accused (hence "legitimate rape" as opposed to false accusations of rape), or is defined in a way that most would not recognize it as rape (say a 20 year-old and 17 year-old couple having consensual intercourse in a state with an age of consent at 18).
- Rape pregnancies are rare. This can mean various things, but he probably means both that it's rare absolutely i.e. a tiny fraction of all pregnancies are due to rape, and that pregnancy results from rape less often than it would from ordinary, unprotected, consensual intercourse.
- There is a biological reaction to rape which affects female physiology and decreases the likelihood of impregnation.
These are his fundamental claims. The first is uncontroversial; it's a fact that rape is sometimes falsely accused, and that some statutory rape laws are written so as to define certain sex acts as 'rape' that many would not consider it to be.
Half of the 2nd bullet point is also uncontroversial. It's a fact that rape takes place much less often than consensual sex, and that pregnancy from rape is itself rare, absolutely. However, if he meant that the frequency of pregnancy-cum-rape is rare compared to the frequency it occurs in consensual sex, per sex act, then the claim becomes controversial.
A much-cited 1996 study suggests that it isn't significantly more rare, in the latter sense. Though there are questions about the legitimacy of the conclusions of that study, as well as other factors that need to be considered, such as the fact that consensual sex has the feature of allowing for partners to practice pregnancy-prevention; rape has no such feature. Or that only 11.7% of the victims sought immediate medical attention, which leaves open a significant possibility of false allegations (or diagnoses) of rape. In any case, his use of 'rare' is certainly defensible and in no sense demonstrably false. Even on the study's chosen terms of per-sex-act rape-pregnancy of those raped who are age 12-47, 5% is still compatible with the descriptor 'rare'.
The amorphous character of these numbers -- and thus their meaninglessness -- is illustrated in contradictions between studies. Another article at Scientific American is being cited by some, purporting to be a corrective to Akin. In that article they cite DOJ statistics stating that "in 2004-2005, 64,080 women were raped." In the aforementioned 1996 survey, they put the number of rape pregnancies at 32,000 a year. Some quick math seems to suggest that in 2004-2005, 100% of women who got raped got pregnant from it. Given the manifold complications in studying the topic, such contradictions are not entirely inexplicable -- aforementioned ones, reported versus unreported rapes, forcible rape versus statutory rape, false allegations of rape etc. -- but then don't run around waving the sheets of statistics in your hand, claiming to have disproved Akin. You haven't.
The third bullet point is the real sticking point. If there is such a biological mechanism, it hasn't yet been identified clearly (although there are at least viable candidates). However, a biological mechanism has been identified that links increases in stress to a decrease in fertility. One need only make an inference to rape increasing stress and anxiety in order to link rape to a decrease female fertility. And given research on that topic, that seems a very reasonable inference. Not that this means that Akin is clearly, unquestionably correct in this aspect of his remarks, but he isn't obviously wrong either, contra the seething mass of demagogues.
The Framing of His Defense
No one questions this aspect of the critique of Akin. By just about everyone's reckoning, he screwed up badly here and on multiple levels. There are times to point out that certain charges of rape are illegitimate, but not here, not now, and not in this way. His use of "legitimate rape" wording was a big mistake. Further, his claim that the female body has something to "shut the whole thing down" is misleading and poorly worded, even if he is right. If there's any truth to the claim, it's that the stress and anxiety produced from a rape causes certain hormones that hinder reproduction to start producing excessively, and decrease the rate of conception by some factor. If you're going to get into that issue -- which is itself a bad political decision -- then at least be able to phrase your position in a more accurate, intelligent manner.
And, as a politician, he should have gone out of his way to cushion his remarks with disclaiming statements of care. Such as noting that some pregnancies do occur from rape (however rarely), and that such victims need care, and how he supports groups which offer victimized women alternatives and counseling. Or at least something along these lines. He spoke about rape and abortion and only really spoke about the rapist and the conceived child! Mostly treating the woman dismissively as a nonentity or an intermediary. This is quite careless and offensive, and definitely deserves criticism. He must make the point that, though there are competing interests, especially those of the victim, he still concludes that the life of the child supersede those interests.
He could have made substantially the same point in a different manner without giving anyone a legitimate reason to rebuke him, but on this level he failed utterly.
The Response
But enough about Akin. The response to his remark is much more interesting to me. On the Left, there has been predictable reaction: straw-manning Akin's argument (claiming Akin claimed rape can't cause pregnancy, which he never did); boiler-plate vitriolic hysteria; confused or disingenuous outrage; 'scientific' demagoguery. You know the drill.
On the Right, as I've noted above, there exists division. While many movement conservatives are pragmatically concerned about the gravity of this election cycle and thus want him to step down, others think that defending him -- to the extent possible -- is a matter of principle, either on the substance of the matter itself or in solidarity with our brothers in arms. While I'm obviously defending him, my sympathies are torn by these two completely legitimate concerns. What we absolutely should not do -- which a disturbing number of conservatives are doing -- is pile on, in one voice with the Left, denouncing Akin as ignorant or 'wrong'. Sure, criticize him for his carelessness, his callousness, or his failure as a politician. And if that carelessness seems likely to cost us a Senate seat, then advocate for him to step down, but don't pretend it was anything more than a gaffe.
The most obnoxious of all the responses have to be the pedants looking to 'fact-check' or 'refute' Akin's claims (such as The Atlantic and i09 pieces linked above). The only empirical or quasi-empirical claims he made are that A) rape pregnancies are rare (true) and B) that female biology makes conception less likely in rape victims by some degree (not demonstrably true, but not demonstrably false). If you read his statements in a manner that best suits your argument -- such as reading 'rare' to mean 'comparatively rare per sex act', rather than 'absolutely rare' -- then don't complain when I point out that there is nothing necessary about reading his comments in such a manner or that, even if you do, he still isn't necessarily wrong.
Generally, the response has been disappointingly emotional and reactionary across a wide swath of responders. What is there to get so upset about? It was already known that Republicans are Pro-life, so no novel developments on that count. It was similarly known that many Republicans oppose rape exceptions in theoretical abortion law, on coherent, morally serious grounds. Again, not news. The fact that a politician bungled a question, made dubious (but not false) empirical claims, and his indelicate and flippant response came off as calloused toward women? Fair game, but it's a back-page story at best. A politician's error is costing one party a likely Senate seat in a vitally important election year, and the other party is using it, not only to possibly win that particular Senate race, but as a tool to paint Republicans in general as anti-scientific, anti-woman, etc. and leverage this caricature for broad political advantage? Aha, now this is worth getting worked-up over, for those on all sides. And as long as we see it clearly for what it is, it's not a problem. Let's just be sure to harshly condemn those elements diabolically pretending it's about something else.
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
The Pragmatics of (Theoretical) Abortion Law
As the topic of abortion has become taboo and as the respective sides have hunkered into their corners, the issue seem to be broached less and less. Either you think life begins at conception, or you don't. Either you think a mother's "right to do what she wants with her body" trumps a fetus' right to live or you don't. Of course, framing the issue this way exposes my bias, and it isn't completely true as there are gradations of disagreements that go beyond these dichotomies, but the point is that meaningful discussion across the Pro-life / Pro-choice divide happens rarely.
But what about meaningful discussion within the spectrum of those views? That is, discussion about the topic of abortion and its implications among Pro-lifers, or among Pro-choicers, internally.
On the Pro-choice side of things the focus always appears to be solely, or at least primarily, on preventing anyone or anything from pushing back against "a woman's right to choose". In practical terms, this is all they are concerned with. And so the discussion among themselves tends to revolve around this singular objective. They may also have discussions about practical means of reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies, and therefore reducing the number of abortions, but this seems to be only tangentially related to the issue of abortions. Reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies is something anyone can advocate, whatever they think of abortion.
On the Pro-life side of things, just by the nature of the case, the discussion is much more diverse and varied. From a policy perspective, if you do aim to make abortion illegal, it potentially leads to many other pragmatic questions that must be addressed. While if you aim to keep it legal at the federal level, there is only one real question that needs to be addressed, which is how best to defend the current legal status quo.
In a recent guided discussion with some Christian friends, who seemed to be fairly Pro-life, the topic brought up many practical concerns about the theoretical criminalization of abortion. If we were really to achieve this, by overturning Roe v. Wade, returning the issue to the states and having some states, inevitably, make it illegal, what would that look like? How would it work? How would it be enforced? Would there be exceptions?
These are issues that opponents of legal abortion must consider that proponents don't have to. [1]
The first question the group asked about criminalization of abortion is whether we, as proponents, were prepared to arrest and jail young women for the crime of abortion. While this issue was raised by the group I think it's mostly easily dismissed. Criminalization would have to include means of enforcing the law, but obviously the primary means would not be arresting or jailing individual perpetrators (though any legislation outlawing abortion would likely include this as one tool of enforcement), but by outlawing abortion clinics and enforcing the law on the physician's end. Policing illegal, back-alley abortions would be difficult. Unless, say, a husband or boyfriend pressed charges against a wife -- something which would itself be rare -- the illegal abortions that did happen would be very difficult to do anything about.
As for whether we would be prepared to advocate long prison sentences for the to-be criminals, in those rare instances where they are caught red-handed or where charges are pressed against them, I have no qualms about that whatsoever. Though others in the group did, I didn't understand their hesitance. I believe that the empathy they feel for someone who may be in a desperate situation causes some to question the logic of criminalization, yet we don't seem to feel quite the same empathy for thieves in desperate situations. Or at least, if we do feel that empathy, we're sensible enough not to allow it to mitigate against the logic of having laws against theft and enforcing them.
A related concern arises: will criminalization be effective in decreasing the number of abortions that happen? Will it just make back-alley abortions, which are much more dangerous, skyrocket?
If Roe ever was overturned, the issue would be sent back to the states. Some would make it illegal and others would not. It's almost certain that within those states where it was made illegal rates of abortion would plummet. With abortion clinics gone, and it being illegal for physicians in those states to perform the procedure, very few doctors would risk performing abortive procedures in illicit ways, as the risk would be too great for them. Similarly, the widespread knowledge about the risk of homemade abortions would prevent from those up-ticking too sharply.
The most likely scenario is that interstate travel to get an abortion in a state where it is legal would become frequent. Or, if the proponents of criminalizing abortion had it their way, international travel would be required, after every state made abortion illegal as well. In which case those seeking a place to have a legal abortion would most likely go to Canada (seeing as Mexico is heading along an anti-abortion path of its own). Of course, this would take decades to happen, if it were to happen at all. But this is what proponents want, whether or not it's immediately realistic isn't the issue. We must think through all the implications of our advocacy.
And what would the practical results of all 50 states making abortion illegal? It's impossible to say conclusively, but if you look at it in terms of the cost-benefit analysis for having an abortion, the cost to have one -- international travel fare, time, jail time, or significant increased risk to a woman's own health -- will have gone up immensely, while the "benefit" will have stayed the same. Since people tend to behave in self-interested ways, it's difficult to imagine abortions doing anything but dropping off significantly in that scenario.
During the interval when it's illegal in some states, but legal in others, the cost side of the cost-benefit equation within those states where it's illegal will also have gone up, though not as dramatically. The cost now includes the cost of interstate travel, but that's all. Still, that's enough of a hassle for enough people that the number of abortions occurring in the nation would still likely decrease immediately, though perhaps not drastically.
Another pragmatic issue that arose in the discussion was whether it would be easier for a rich person to get around the laws -- by travelling to neighboring states, or somehow procuring a black market abortion -- than a poor person. The implication seemed to be that if it was -- and obviously it is -- this should somehow play into our consideration of whether or not to make it illegal. On this point I just don't follow the logic. Virtually all criminal activity is more prevalent among the poor than the rich, yet we don't use this fact as a reason not to criminalize theft or assault. One might point out at this juncture that when the rich do do those things, they have a much better chance at getting acquitted of the charges. Is this an argument not to criminalize them? Of course not. It's not an argument of any kind, it's an emotional, guilt-based appeal.
Some would claim that the poor just commit the kind of criminal acts that are easier to "see", and therefore prosecute, than the rich, whose criminal acts are just better hidden. This is a theory that can't truly be tested, and therefore refuted -- there are no statistics on the crimes that we have no record of which might be happening, by poor or rich people -- but there's very good reason to doubt the validity of this hypothesis. Mostly by applying the same cost-benefit analysis to the incentive to do crime. People who are already rich have much less incentive to do anything illegal, as they risk what they already have, where poor people often have little or nothing to lose. None of which is to insinuate that its the inherent moral character of the poor that is at issue -- it's not -- or that corporate crime doesn't happen -- it does -- but it's about what poverty inherently means, and what its effects on people in a nation of laws are and should be.
This argument could require a book of its own so I'll stop short here, but my point, which should be uncontroversial, is that whatever you think about how much crime the poor commit compared to the rich, and the reasons behind it, the effects the theoretical anti-abortion laws will likely have on the economically disadvantaged should play no role in our decision whether or not to criminalize the behavior.
One final issue that came up that I'll discuss here is the question of, if you decide to criminalize abortion, whether or not there would be exceptions in cases like when the life of the mother is at risk, or perhaps in cases of rape or incest. This would be up to the state legislatures and how they choose to write their laws, but there's nothing preventing a state from including exceptions. Our murder laws have exceptions for self-defense and insanity, so why would our abortion laws not be able to have exceptions? Choosing what exceptions to allow and which to not might be a difficult task, but the question of exceptions doesn't fundamentally address the question of whether we ought to criminalize abortion at all.
Our discussion brought up many other issues as well, but these were the ones that cut to the heart of the issue for me, which is the legal question. Should abortion be made illegal, and if so, are there any practical, pragmatic concerns which would mitigate against criminalizing it? For me, the answer is a resounding "no."
[1] - Or at least proponents hope they never will have to, and they prefer to focus on defending the status quo, for the time being.
But what about meaningful discussion within the spectrum of those views? That is, discussion about the topic of abortion and its implications among Pro-lifers, or among Pro-choicers, internally.
On the Pro-choice side of things the focus always appears to be solely, or at least primarily, on preventing anyone or anything from pushing back against "a woman's right to choose". In practical terms, this is all they are concerned with. And so the discussion among themselves tends to revolve around this singular objective. They may also have discussions about practical means of reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies, and therefore reducing the number of abortions, but this seems to be only tangentially related to the issue of abortions. Reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies is something anyone can advocate, whatever they think of abortion.
On the Pro-life side of things, just by the nature of the case, the discussion is much more diverse and varied. From a policy perspective, if you do aim to make abortion illegal, it potentially leads to many other pragmatic questions that must be addressed. While if you aim to keep it legal at the federal level, there is only one real question that needs to be addressed, which is how best to defend the current legal status quo.
In a recent guided discussion with some Christian friends, who seemed to be fairly Pro-life, the topic brought up many practical concerns about the theoretical criminalization of abortion. If we were really to achieve this, by overturning Roe v. Wade, returning the issue to the states and having some states, inevitably, make it illegal, what would that look like? How would it work? How would it be enforced? Would there be exceptions?
These are issues that opponents of legal abortion must consider that proponents don't have to. [1]
The first question the group asked about criminalization of abortion is whether we, as proponents, were prepared to arrest and jail young women for the crime of abortion. While this issue was raised by the group I think it's mostly easily dismissed. Criminalization would have to include means of enforcing the law, but obviously the primary means would not be arresting or jailing individual perpetrators (though any legislation outlawing abortion would likely include this as one tool of enforcement), but by outlawing abortion clinics and enforcing the law on the physician's end. Policing illegal, back-alley abortions would be difficult. Unless, say, a husband or boyfriend pressed charges against a wife -- something which would itself be rare -- the illegal abortions that did happen would be very difficult to do anything about.
As for whether we would be prepared to advocate long prison sentences for the to-be criminals, in those rare instances where they are caught red-handed or where charges are pressed against them, I have no qualms about that whatsoever. Though others in the group did, I didn't understand their hesitance. I believe that the empathy they feel for someone who may be in a desperate situation causes some to question the logic of criminalization, yet we don't seem to feel quite the same empathy for thieves in desperate situations. Or at least, if we do feel that empathy, we're sensible enough not to allow it to mitigate against the logic of having laws against theft and enforcing them.
A related concern arises: will criminalization be effective in decreasing the number of abortions that happen? Will it just make back-alley abortions, which are much more dangerous, skyrocket?
If Roe ever was overturned, the issue would be sent back to the states. Some would make it illegal and others would not. It's almost certain that within those states where it was made illegal rates of abortion would plummet. With abortion clinics gone, and it being illegal for physicians in those states to perform the procedure, very few doctors would risk performing abortive procedures in illicit ways, as the risk would be too great for them. Similarly, the widespread knowledge about the risk of homemade abortions would prevent from those up-ticking too sharply.
The most likely scenario is that interstate travel to get an abortion in a state where it is legal would become frequent. Or, if the proponents of criminalizing abortion had it their way, international travel would be required, after every state made abortion illegal as well. In which case those seeking a place to have a legal abortion would most likely go to Canada (seeing as Mexico is heading along an anti-abortion path of its own). Of course, this would take decades to happen, if it were to happen at all. But this is what proponents want, whether or not it's immediately realistic isn't the issue. We must think through all the implications of our advocacy.
And what would the practical results of all 50 states making abortion illegal? It's impossible to say conclusively, but if you look at it in terms of the cost-benefit analysis for having an abortion, the cost to have one -- international travel fare, time, jail time, or significant increased risk to a woman's own health -- will have gone up immensely, while the "benefit" will have stayed the same. Since people tend to behave in self-interested ways, it's difficult to imagine abortions doing anything but dropping off significantly in that scenario.
During the interval when it's illegal in some states, but legal in others, the cost side of the cost-benefit equation within those states where it's illegal will also have gone up, though not as dramatically. The cost now includes the cost of interstate travel, but that's all. Still, that's enough of a hassle for enough people that the number of abortions occurring in the nation would still likely decrease immediately, though perhaps not drastically.
Another pragmatic issue that arose in the discussion was whether it would be easier for a rich person to get around the laws -- by travelling to neighboring states, or somehow procuring a black market abortion -- than a poor person. The implication seemed to be that if it was -- and obviously it is -- this should somehow play into our consideration of whether or not to make it illegal. On this point I just don't follow the logic. Virtually all criminal activity is more prevalent among the poor than the rich, yet we don't use this fact as a reason not to criminalize theft or assault. One might point out at this juncture that when the rich do do those things, they have a much better chance at getting acquitted of the charges. Is this an argument not to criminalize them? Of course not. It's not an argument of any kind, it's an emotional, guilt-based appeal.
Some would claim that the poor just commit the kind of criminal acts that are easier to "see", and therefore prosecute, than the rich, whose criminal acts are just better hidden. This is a theory that can't truly be tested, and therefore refuted -- there are no statistics on the crimes that we have no record of which might be happening, by poor or rich people -- but there's very good reason to doubt the validity of this hypothesis. Mostly by applying the same cost-benefit analysis to the incentive to do crime. People who are already rich have much less incentive to do anything illegal, as they risk what they already have, where poor people often have little or nothing to lose. None of which is to insinuate that its the inherent moral character of the poor that is at issue -- it's not -- or that corporate crime doesn't happen -- it does -- but it's about what poverty inherently means, and what its effects on people in a nation of laws are and should be.
This argument could require a book of its own so I'll stop short here, but my point, which should be uncontroversial, is that whatever you think about how much crime the poor commit compared to the rich, and the reasons behind it, the effects the theoretical anti-abortion laws will likely have on the economically disadvantaged should play no role in our decision whether or not to criminalize the behavior.
One final issue that came up that I'll discuss here is the question of, if you decide to criminalize abortion, whether or not there would be exceptions in cases like when the life of the mother is at risk, or perhaps in cases of rape or incest. This would be up to the state legislatures and how they choose to write their laws, but there's nothing preventing a state from including exceptions. Our murder laws have exceptions for self-defense and insanity, so why would our abortion laws not be able to have exceptions? Choosing what exceptions to allow and which to not might be a difficult task, but the question of exceptions doesn't fundamentally address the question of whether we ought to criminalize abortion at all.
Our discussion brought up many other issues as well, but these were the ones that cut to the heart of the issue for me, which is the legal question. Should abortion be made illegal, and if so, are there any practical, pragmatic concerns which would mitigate against criminalizing it? For me, the answer is a resounding "no."
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Friday, August 19, 2011
David Foster Wallace on Abortion
If you recall the recent grammatical dust-up between David Bentley Hart and a few blogging descriptivists, Hart addressed the issue in his bi-weekly column yesterday. For some reason one of the editors at First Things included a link to David Foster Wallace's superb essay on American usage, which I promptly re-read. As riveting as grammar and usage wars are, this post addresses a short aside in Wallace's essay that has nothing to do with those topics.
Here is the excerpt (which seems to have been excised from the version of the essay on Harpers' site. I got this from the version in Consider the Lobster):
The point is that the appropriate, logical conclusion of the two Principles that Wallace has formulated is that abortion is wrong because the first Principle overrides the second. The right to life trumps the right to 'choose', and Wallace states no reason these two principles should carry identical weight, which is what he must demonstrate to conclude that an exactly centrist position is best. Additionally, the second Principle is grounded in some "irresolvable doubt" that Wallace has quietly smuggled in. Whence such doubt? The first Principle was formulated with "inarguable soundness." Presumably the doubt comes in because of the second Principle, but the second Principle can't be formulated apart from an extant doubt. Thus the second principle is circular and the real logical conclusion, when these two principles collide, is a Pro-life one.
Not to mention that this Pro-life conclusion is arrived at even while accepting Wallace's claim that a) the origin of human-being-ness question is inadjudicable and b) that the crux of the issue is human-being-ness. Neither of which are compelled by evidence. If we state the principle that destroying a unique, innocent, human life -- all of which a just-conceived embryo is necessarily -- is wrong, then issues of personhood or human-being-ness are superceded. Which only strengthens the argument for a Pro-life conclusion, which is already firmly established by the two principles.
Wallace is one hundred times more intelligent than I am, but I have the occasionally-useful advantage of never having been within 100 yards of a liberal arts or humanities department, and am entirely immune to the unfortunate political correctness that it breeds.
Interestingly, later in the essay Wallace shows that he is acutely aware of just such instances of being technically, indisputably correct about something (just as his argument in favor of Pro-life would be, were he to follow it through), but having the PC, liberal academic machinery rear its ugly head forces him to yield some ground. Not going so far as to admit he's wrong, but that he was perhaps clumsy or insensitive. All this, however, took place over the comparatively emotionally dry topic of the English language:
Here is the excerpt (which seems to have been excised from the version of the essay on Harpers' site. I got this from the version in Consider the Lobster):
In this reviewer's opinion, the only really coherent position on the abortion issue is one that is both Pro-life and Pro-choice.For someone immersed in the culture of liberal academia, it's admirable that Wallace even allows himself to reason his way to this moderate position. However, he can't quite bring himself to go all the way, possibly for fear that his exquisite reasoning has lead him to a standard, conservative, privileged, white, American, male position on an issue that liberal academic circles would be especially prone to suspecting such biases for being the true source of the conclusion, rather than the flawless reason. Indeed, a subsequent passage indicates that just such an insecurity is very likely in play in Wallace's thought.
Given our best present medical and philosophical understandings of what makes something not just a living organism but a person, there is no way to establish at just what point during gestation a fertilized ovum becomes a human being. This conundrum, together with the basically inarguable soundness of the principle “When in irresolvable doubt about whether something is a human being or not, it is better not to kill it,” appears to me to require any reasonable American to be Pro-Life.
At the same time, however, the principle “When in irresolvable doubt about something, I have neither the legal nor the moral right to tell another person what to do about it, especially if that person feels that s/he is not in doubt” is an unassailable part of the Democratic pact we Americans all make with one another, a pact in which each adult citizen gets to be an autonomous moral agent; and this principle appears to me to require any reasonable American to be Pro-Choice.
The point is that the appropriate, logical conclusion of the two Principles that Wallace has formulated is that abortion is wrong because the first Principle overrides the second. The right to life trumps the right to 'choose', and Wallace states no reason these two principles should carry identical weight, which is what he must demonstrate to conclude that an exactly centrist position is best. Additionally, the second Principle is grounded in some "irresolvable doubt" that Wallace has quietly smuggled in. Whence such doubt? The first Principle was formulated with "inarguable soundness." Presumably the doubt comes in because of the second Principle, but the second Principle can't be formulated apart from an extant doubt. Thus the second principle is circular and the real logical conclusion, when these two principles collide, is a Pro-life one.
Not to mention that this Pro-life conclusion is arrived at even while accepting Wallace's claim that a) the origin of human-being-ness question is inadjudicable and b) that the crux of the issue is human-being-ness. Neither of which are compelled by evidence. If we state the principle that destroying a unique, innocent, human life -- all of which a just-conceived embryo is necessarily -- is wrong, then issues of personhood or human-being-ness are superceded. Which only strengthens the argument for a Pro-life conclusion, which is already firmly established by the two principles.
Wallace is one hundred times more intelligent than I am, but I have the occasionally-useful advantage of never having been within 100 yards of a liberal arts or humanities department, and am entirely immune to the unfortunate political correctness that it breeds.
Interestingly, later in the essay Wallace shows that he is acutely aware of just such instances of being technically, indisputably correct about something (just as his argument in favor of Pro-life would be, were he to follow it through), but having the PC, liberal academic machinery rear its ugly head forces him to yield some ground. Not going so far as to admit he's wrong, but that he was perhaps clumsy or insensitive. All this, however, took place over the comparatively emotionally dry topic of the English language:
A vividly concrete illustration here concerns the Official Complaint a black undergraduate filed against this rev. after one of my little in camera spiels described on pages 53-54. The complainant was (I opine) wrong, but she was not crazy or stupid; and I was able later to see that I did bear some responsibility for the whole nasty administrative swivet. My culpability lay in gross rhetorical naivete. I'd seen my speech's primary Appeal as Logical: The aim was to make a conspicuously blunt, honest argument for SWE's [Standard Written English] utility. It wasn't pretty, maybe, but it was true, plus so manifestly bullshit-free that I think I anticipated not just acquiescence but gratitude for my candor. [44] The problem I failed to see, of course, lay not with the argument per se but with the person making it — namely me, a Privileged WASP Male in a position of power, thus someone whose statements about the primacy and utility of the Privileged WASP Male dialect appeared not candid/hortatory/ authoritative/true but elitist/high-handed/ authoritarian/racist. Rhetoric-wise what happened was that I allowed the substance and style of my Logical Appeal to completely torpedo my Ethical Appeal: What the student heard was just another PWM rationalizing why his Group and his English were top dog and ought "logically" to stay that way (plus, worse, trying to use his academic power over her to coerce her assent [45] ).
If for any reason you happen to find yourself sharing this particular student's perceptions and reaction, [46] I would ask that you bracket your feelings long enough to recognize that the PWM instructor's very modern rhetorical dilemma in that office was really no different from the dilemma faced by a male who makes a Pro-Life argument, or an atheist who argues against Creation Science, or a Caucasian who opposes Affirmative Action, or an African American who decries Racial Profiling, or anyone over eighteen who tries to make a case for raising the legal driving age to eighteen, etc. The dilemma has nothing to do with whether the arguments themselves are plausible or right or even sane, because the debate rarely gets that far — any opponent with sufficiently strong feelings or a dogmatic bent can discredit the arguments and pretty much foreclose all further discussion with a single, terribly familiar rejoinder: "Of course you'd say that"; "Easy for you to say"; "What right do you have ...?"It should be obvious how such an environment could lead one to temper his position considerably on the much more emotionally charged issue of abortion, even when possessing the indisputable truth that is uncomfortable for many in liberal academia -- especially females -- to hear or deal with.
Saturday, April 16, 2011
The False Standard of Personhood
Watching my facebook feed today I saw this message appear from an anti-abortion fan page: "The abortion issue isn't about choice, but rather it's about this single question: Is an unborn baby a person?"
While I believe that an unborn baby probably is a person, I think that this actually weakens the position of the Pro-life argument rather than strengthens it. It plays into the hands of abortion advocates because it enters into ambiguous territory, where the waters are murky, when there is no need to do so.
The standard for what constitutes personhood is not a clear-cut issue and some conceptions of personhood wouldn't include a fertilized embryo. Because 'personhood' is a disputed concept which can be interpreted in a variety of ways--many of which include appealing to features that a 1 day old fetus doesn't posses, such as consciousness--submitting to 'personhood' as the proper standard for determining whether a being is worthy of legal protection against murder is an unnecessary concession on the part of the Anti-abortion position. It opens a door for the Pro-abortion position that should remain closed.
Alternatively, the standards for defining what constitutes a unique human life are unequivocal and a matter of scientific fact. If it is never acceptable to destroy an innocent, unique human life then abortion is murder. And a fertilized embryo, at the moment of conception, is all of those things factually: unique (it has its own DNA), innocent (clearly), human (product of the human reproductive process) and life (biologically). This standard affords the pro-abortion position no wiggle room as they literally, as a matter of fact, can't deny any of the descriptors that have been applied to the fetus. Therefore they are forced to concede that they think it is acceptable to forcibly destroy a unique, innocent human life--which any sane, moral person should loathe to admit.
Framing the debate in this way forces proponents of abortion to face just exactly what it is that they are advocating directly, without the vague, murky language of 'personhood' confusing the issue. If an honest person, when confronted with this argument, still wants to say "Yes, it's OK to destroy a unique, innocent human life as long as that life is very young" then I think we have come to a proper impasse. We can now, with a very clear conscience, write off this person's opinion as morally depraved.
This may sound a bit harsh, and I know that for some it is hard to accept that such a contentious issue could possibly be this straightforward with no real grey areas. But I've heard every argument in favor of abortion and none of them serve to refute the logic that I've just laid out.
As for the 'positive' arguments in favor of legal abortion, I can't find any that would be significant given the weight of the argument already laid out:
Slavery used to be a contentious issue in the U.S. Whether the Earth was flat or not used to be a contentious issue. Whether the Earth was the center of the universe used to be hotly contested. I truly believe, and believe that I can thoroughly demonstrate, that the issue of abortion is more qualitatively similar to these types of issues than truly ambiguous issues--such as what makes a 'person'.
While I believe that an unborn baby probably is a person, I think that this actually weakens the position of the Pro-life argument rather than strengthens it. It plays into the hands of abortion advocates because it enters into ambiguous territory, where the waters are murky, when there is no need to do so.
The standard for what constitutes personhood is not a clear-cut issue and some conceptions of personhood wouldn't include a fertilized embryo. Because 'personhood' is a disputed concept which can be interpreted in a variety of ways--many of which include appealing to features that a 1 day old fetus doesn't posses, such as consciousness--submitting to 'personhood' as the proper standard for determining whether a being is worthy of legal protection against murder is an unnecessary concession on the part of the Anti-abortion position. It opens a door for the Pro-abortion position that should remain closed.
Alternatively, the standards for defining what constitutes a unique human life are unequivocal and a matter of scientific fact. If it is never acceptable to destroy an innocent, unique human life then abortion is murder. And a fertilized embryo, at the moment of conception, is all of those things factually: unique (it has its own DNA), innocent (clearly), human (product of the human reproductive process) and life (biologically). This standard affords the pro-abortion position no wiggle room as they literally, as a matter of fact, can't deny any of the descriptors that have been applied to the fetus. Therefore they are forced to concede that they think it is acceptable to forcibly destroy a unique, innocent human life--which any sane, moral person should loathe to admit.
Framing the debate in this way forces proponents of abortion to face just exactly what it is that they are advocating directly, without the vague, murky language of 'personhood' confusing the issue. If an honest person, when confronted with this argument, still wants to say "Yes, it's OK to destroy a unique, innocent human life as long as that life is very young" then I think we have come to a proper impasse. We can now, with a very clear conscience, write off this person's opinion as morally depraved.
This may sound a bit harsh, and I know that for some it is hard to accept that such a contentious issue could possibly be this straightforward with no real grey areas. But I've heard every argument in favor of abortion and none of them serve to refute the logic that I've just laid out.
As for the 'positive' arguments in favor of legal abortion, I can't find any that would be significant given the weight of the argument already laid out:
- The 'right to privacy' cited in Roe is pure judicial invention and is rightly worthy of scorn.
- Arguments that highlight the social benefits of abortion are moot because, even if the social benefits are great, that could also be true for infanticide, euthanasia and even genocide. In any of those cases we recognize that any social benefits derived from mass killings are irrelevant because the individual's right to live trumps all social considerations.
- Focusing on the mother's rights gets you no where because--once we've established that the fetus is a unique, innocent human life--the right to life trumps the 'right to choose'.
- Arguments relating to the mother's health, rape and incest are advanced on behalf of situational ethics and are not arguments in favor of keeping abortion illegal as such, but only arguments that these special considerations must be taken into account when they arise. Duly noted, but these can't be arguments in favor of legal abortion any more than the fact that sometimes killings happen in self-defense is an argument in favor of legal murder.
Slavery used to be a contentious issue in the U.S. Whether the Earth was flat or not used to be a contentious issue. Whether the Earth was the center of the universe used to be hotly contested. I truly believe, and believe that I can thoroughly demonstrate, that the issue of abortion is more qualitatively similar to these types of issues than truly ambiguous issues--such as what makes a 'person'.
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Antiquity, Christianity and Modernity on The Sanctity of Human Life
A friend of mine recently posted a link to a video of a sermon by Mike Erre in which he highlights the strain of thought present in Greek antiquity which displays calloused disregard for human life that is 'defective'--meaning, primarily, the mentally or physically disabled--along with an intense glorification of all things triumphant, beautiful, and well-proportioned about humanity. He then asks whether this Hellenism is still alive today, pointing to our culture's obsession with body image, abortion of the disabled, and the practice of eugenics as evidence that it is, at least to some degree.
The stirring video reminded me of David B. Hart's phenomenal essay on John Paul II's Theology of the Body. Where the message from Erre focused primarily on antiquity and whether the Hellenistic aspect of it persists, Hart turns his attention to the ethos of modernity and finds a similar, but distinct, strain of anti-humanism--or at least anti-'defective'-humanism-in-service-of-a-greater-humanism, as a proponent of this point of view might prefer to have it.
Hart also draws our attention to eugenicists but makes a very bold claim; while most bioengineers, abortion advocates or proponents of unfettered embryonic stem cell research would likely claim to abhor eugenics and other 'extreme' manifestations of their discipline or belief system, Hart argues that eugenics, euthanasia, forced sterilization, selective breeding, infanticide, and genocide all follow logically and properly from the post-Christian, 'rationalist', Darwinian ethos of modernity, and that the moderate moderns just aren't as steadfast in their convictions as the eugenicists. Which is a fancy way of stating the rather obvious; that a rejection of Christ--the creator, sustainer and redeemer of all human life--is a rejection of the inherent beauty and sanctity of all human life.
Hart, visa-vis John Paul II, rejects outright the notion that bioengineering, bioethics, eugenics, stem-cell research or any of these distinctly modern issues require any nuance or subtlety on the part of a Christian engaging with this cultural phenomenon.
To one who holds to John Paul’s Christian understanding of the body, and so believes that each human being, from the very first moment of existence, emerges from and is called towards eternity, there are no negotiable or even very perplexing issues regarding our moral obligations before the mystery of life. Not only is every abortion performed an act of murder, but so is the destruction of every “superfluous” embryo created in fertility clinics or every embryo produced for the purposes of embryonic stem cell research ... Even if, say, research on embryonic stem cells could produce therapies that would heal the lame, or reverse senility, or repair a damaged brain, or prolong life, this would in no measure alter the moral calculus of the situation: human life is an infinite good, never an instrumental resource; human life is possessed of an absolute sanctity, and no benefit (real or supposed) can justify its destruction.
For the Christian there seems there should be very little grey area. For many in Antiquity there was not much grey area (either you were a defective or you weren't). For the fully dedicated post-Christian Modern there shouldn't be any grey area either. Either human life (all of it quite defective in one sense, as Mike Erre rightly points out) is disposable or it isn't. Which is it?
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Retrospect for 'Retrospect For Life'
The song "Retrospect for Life" is featured on the 1997 album by Common One Day It'll All Make Sense, the eagerly awaited follow up to his masterpiece Resurrection. The song features the vocals of Lauryn Hill singing lines from Stevie Wonder's Never Dreamed You'd Leave in Summer. The song was the first single released for the album. Living in 2010, an era where the first single to a rap album is almost required to be some catchy club-friendly tune which can easily translate into a ringtone, the idea of a mellow, soulful, conceptual track about abortion being the lead commercial single for an album seems almost inconceivable. And even in 1997 it was far from typical, but then Common isn't your typical artist.
The song is about a man reflecting on the decision that he made with his current girlfriend to abort their child. The first verse of the song is addressed to the aborted child; the second verse is addressed to the girlfriend. While I would hesitate to call the song 'Pro-life' it is certainly anti-abortion. For me there is no distinction between those two things, but some people believe that a woman should have a legal right to terminate a pregnancy, even though they believe it's the wrong thing to do. Such people might correctly be labeled 'anti-abortion', but not 'pro-life'. I believe such a position is confused, but that isn't the point of this piece. The point is that Common might merely be espousing an anti-abortion position rather than a Pro-life one.
In the first verse Common reflects on what it would have meant for him to have a son:
And he goes on to address his own hypocrisy:
These lines are both clever and profound. In the first bar he's referencing the ideals that he professes in his own music. Namely the fact that he opposes much of the violence in popular rap music, as well as the violence he sees within urban culture in general. Yet here he is performing an act of the most heinous violence against his own son for his own selfish purposes. While the second bar is a brilliant double entendre.
The song is not intended to be an ideological treatise on abortion or to even comment on the arguments that surround the legal and moral aspects of the issue. Instead it's approached in a manner that comes off as introspective and self-searching rather than as demagoguery. The downside to this is that some of the very human thoughts and emotions contain some very pitiful rationalizations which the narrator wanders through. Such as: "But I wasn't prepared mentally nor financially / Havin a child shouldn't have to bring out the man in me / Plus I wanted you to be raised within a family / I don't wanna, go through the drama of havin a baby's momma / Weekend visits and buyin J's ain't gon' make me a father" While these thoughts and concerns are certainly understandable, one should rightly point out that they are concerns that should probably be addressed before impregnating someone. Plus they ignore the viable option of putting the child up for adoption. Ultimately, though, the rationalizations lose out as a decidedly anti-abortion conclusion is reached, most poignantly at the end of the first verse: "from now on I'ma use self control instead of birth control / Cause 315 dollars ain't worth your soul / 315 dollars ain't worth your soul / 315 dollars ain't worth it."
While the first verse dealt more with the past--with the act that had taken place and the narrator's remorse--the second verse is more about the present and future. Addressed to his girlfriend it's an exploration of their relationship and where it's headed. How the abortion brought certain issues and emotions to the surface which now have to be dealt with. Ideally these would be the type of things that people in a mature relationship would consider and discuss before choosing to have sexual relations, but in the real world they often don't come up until after the fact.
The strength of the song is the personal, probing depth of the perspective that is taken. Rather than addressing the issues in a detatched or external way, they're addressed from from within. Its scope isn't limited to the question of abortion itself, but includes the nature of family, relationships, love etc. and how they are all interrelated. It's a powerful and poignant exploration of the abortion issue from a human perspective, with all the imperfection that that entails.
The song is about a man reflecting on the decision that he made with his current girlfriend to abort their child. The first verse of the song is addressed to the aborted child; the second verse is addressed to the girlfriend. While I would hesitate to call the song 'Pro-life' it is certainly anti-abortion. For me there is no distinction between those two things, but some people believe that a woman should have a legal right to terminate a pregnancy, even though they believe it's the wrong thing to do. Such people might correctly be labeled 'anti-abortion', but not 'pro-life'. I believe such a position is confused, but that isn't the point of this piece. The point is that Common might merely be espousing an anti-abortion position rather than a Pro-life one.
In the first verse Common reflects on what it would have meant for him to have a son:
You would've been much more than a mouth to feed
But someone, I woulda fed this information I read
And someone, my life for you I woulda had to lead
Instead I lead you to death
I'm sorry for takin your first breath
First step, and first cry
And he goes on to address his own hypocrisy:
Nerve I got to talk about them [people] with a gun
Must have really thought I was God to take the life of my son
These lines are both clever and profound. In the first bar he's referencing the ideals that he professes in his own music. Namely the fact that he opposes much of the violence in popular rap music, as well as the violence he sees within urban culture in general. Yet here he is performing an act of the most heinous violence against his own son for his own selfish purposes. While the second bar is a brilliant double entendre.
The song is not intended to be an ideological treatise on abortion or to even comment on the arguments that surround the legal and moral aspects of the issue. Instead it's approached in a manner that comes off as introspective and self-searching rather than as demagoguery. The downside to this is that some of the very human thoughts and emotions contain some very pitiful rationalizations which the narrator wanders through. Such as: "But I wasn't prepared mentally nor financially / Havin a child shouldn't have to bring out the man in me / Plus I wanted you to be raised within a family / I don't wanna, go through the drama of havin a baby's momma / Weekend visits and buyin J's ain't gon' make me a father" While these thoughts and concerns are certainly understandable, one should rightly point out that they are concerns that should probably be addressed before impregnating someone. Plus they ignore the viable option of putting the child up for adoption. Ultimately, though, the rationalizations lose out as a decidedly anti-abortion conclusion is reached, most poignantly at the end of the first verse: "from now on I'ma use self control instead of birth control / Cause 315 dollars ain't worth your soul / 315 dollars ain't worth your soul / 315 dollars ain't worth it."
While the first verse dealt more with the past--with the act that had taken place and the narrator's remorse--the second verse is more about the present and future. Addressed to his girlfriend it's an exploration of their relationship and where it's headed. How the abortion brought certain issues and emotions to the surface which now have to be dealt with. Ideally these would be the type of things that people in a mature relationship would consider and discuss before choosing to have sexual relations, but in the real world they often don't come up until after the fact.
Happy deep down but not joyed enough to have it
But even that's a lie, in less than two weeks, we was back at it
Is this unprotected love or safe to say it's lust
Bustin, more than the sweat is somebody you trust
Or is it that we don't trust each other enough
And believe havin this child'll make us have to stay together
I want you in my life cause you have made it better
Thinkin we are in love cause we can spend a day together?
We talkin spendin the rest of our lives
There's too many black women that can say they're mothers
but can't say that they're wives
The strength of the song is the personal, probing depth of the perspective that is taken. Rather than addressing the issues in a detatched or external way, they're addressed from from within. Its scope isn't limited to the question of abortion itself, but includes the nature of family, relationships, love etc. and how they are all interrelated. It's a powerful and poignant exploration of the abortion issue from a human perspective, with all the imperfection that that entails.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Abortion - From a Materialist/Secularist Perspective
As a Christian I find it rarely makes sense to try to convince a non-believer of some religious, spiritual principle, if they do not share the same foundation for establishing truth. However, when it comes to extremely important issues, issues that effect life and death, issues that effect public policy and legislation, which in turn affect us all, Christians understandably want to reach non-believers with their message. When this is the case Christians need to resist the urge to say that 'The Bible says ____', because, as it relates to public policy, and as it relates to convincing non-believers, what it says is not going to be relevant from their perspective.
Thankfully God has made many truths accessible even to those who do not believe. The most obvious way is through authoring the human conscience. However some issues are murky even to those of us who possess a conscience. Our conscience can tell us that ending a human life is wrong, for example, but our conscience can't tell us whether or not a just-conceived embryo constitutes a 'human life'. Luckily, modern science (i.e. embryology) can.
Since the pro-choice position is more prevalent among non-religious people, one would expect that the argument against abortion to be at least partially grounded in supernatural, religious presupposition and dogma. This turns out to not be the case. What we actually find is that the Christian argument against abortion is not contingent upon any specific scriptures (though it is often supplemented by them), or commands from God, and is an argument that can be made completely independent of any belief in any particular God. Though the Christian argument is often made with reference to the soul, and to various scriptures suggesting the soul is present at conception, it is not necessary to posit a soul at any point in order to show that abortion is wrong.
You need only to assert that the wanton destruction of a unique, innocent, human life is wrong (a point virtually all secularists and humanists will grant you), and that a just-conceived embryo is all of these things (which is almost just as obvious, but will take a little more to convince them of). Which, per the definition of each adjective, it factually is.
Thanks to modern science we know that conception is the point at which we become 'unique' (that is, when our own DNA is formed). Just before conception the unfertilized egg and the sperm are still parts of the person they came from, and, as such, the destruction of either the unfertilized egg or the acting sperm would not represent the destruction of a unique, individual entity. The secularist should grant 'unique' without any difficulty, I only mention this to preemptively counter slippery slope arguments such as 'well then is contraception/masturbation murder also?' No, they aren't, for the reasons stated.
'Innocent' should be no problem for the secularist to concede. That one is actually a more interesting debate among and between believers, rather than when dealing with non-believers.
'Human' should be fairly intuitive. The embryo has human DNA, not duck DNA, or platypus DNA, or pterodactyl DNA. This also should be granted readily, and if it isn't then whoever you are trying to convince is probably conflating 'Human' with the philosophical issue of 'personhood', which is not what this is about, because we are arguing the issue from a strictly materialist perspective. It's simply about which particular mammalian species we are discussing.
'Life' might be the only slight sticking point, though it simply is biologically, factually, just that. Biology recognizes single-celled organisms as life, and an embryo consists of many thousands (possibly millions? Biology experts help me out) times more than a single cell.
Thus, if you are against the wanton destruction of unique, innocent, human life, you must be against abortion.
Also, as an addendum, the secularist will often appeal to the social benefits of abortion in arguments that they make, however, even if there are many, I submit that IF we know that an embryo is a human life with rights, then whatever social ills (or benefits) that come from it existing are moot. There are many social benefits to be derived from euthanasia and genocide as well, but few would make the argument that those benefits make euthanasia or genocide justifiable.
Lastly the secularist will appeal to the rights of the mother. And in situations where the life of the mother is in danger, then this becomes relevant. Other than that though, your rights end where the rights of another begin, and the right to life trumps the right to choose.
I've always found it peculiar that the abortion issue is often fought along religious lines, or is at least perceived to be. Pro-life, anti-abortionists should be able to find allies in all walks of life, and across spiritual divides. I think this fact is illustrated well in Christopher Hitchens. He is of course a militant atheist, fervently anti- all things God, but he believes that abortion is wrong on materialist grounds (presumably arriving at that conclusion using some line of reasoning similar to what I have presented).
Thankfully God has made many truths accessible even to those who do not believe. The most obvious way is through authoring the human conscience. However some issues are murky even to those of us who possess a conscience. Our conscience can tell us that ending a human life is wrong, for example, but our conscience can't tell us whether or not a just-conceived embryo constitutes a 'human life'. Luckily, modern science (i.e. embryology) can.
Since the pro-choice position is more prevalent among non-religious people, one would expect that the argument against abortion to be at least partially grounded in supernatural, religious presupposition and dogma. This turns out to not be the case. What we actually find is that the Christian argument against abortion is not contingent upon any specific scriptures (though it is often supplemented by them), or commands from God, and is an argument that can be made completely independent of any belief in any particular God. Though the Christian argument is often made with reference to the soul, and to various scriptures suggesting the soul is present at conception, it is not necessary to posit a soul at any point in order to show that abortion is wrong.
You need only to assert that the wanton destruction of a unique, innocent, human life is wrong (a point virtually all secularists and humanists will grant you), and that a just-conceived embryo is all of these things (which is almost just as obvious, but will take a little more to convince them of). Which, per the definition of each adjective, it factually is.
Thanks to modern science we know that conception is the point at which we become 'unique' (that is, when our own DNA is formed). Just before conception the unfertilized egg and the sperm are still parts of the person they came from, and, as such, the destruction of either the unfertilized egg or the acting sperm would not represent the destruction of a unique, individual entity. The secularist should grant 'unique' without any difficulty, I only mention this to preemptively counter slippery slope arguments such as 'well then is contraception/masturbation murder also?' No, they aren't, for the reasons stated.
'Innocent' should be no problem for the secularist to concede. That one is actually a more interesting debate among and between believers, rather than when dealing with non-believers.
'Human' should be fairly intuitive. The embryo has human DNA, not duck DNA, or platypus DNA, or pterodactyl DNA. This also should be granted readily, and if it isn't then whoever you are trying to convince is probably conflating 'Human' with the philosophical issue of 'personhood', which is not what this is about, because we are arguing the issue from a strictly materialist perspective. It's simply about which particular mammalian species we are discussing.
'Life' might be the only slight sticking point, though it simply is biologically, factually, just that. Biology recognizes single-celled organisms as life, and an embryo consists of many thousands (possibly millions? Biology experts help me out) times more than a single cell.
Thus, if you are against the wanton destruction of unique, innocent, human life, you must be against abortion.
Also, as an addendum, the secularist will often appeal to the social benefits of abortion in arguments that they make, however, even if there are many, I submit that IF we know that an embryo is a human life with rights, then whatever social ills (or benefits) that come from it existing are moot. There are many social benefits to be derived from euthanasia and genocide as well, but few would make the argument that those benefits make euthanasia or genocide justifiable.
Lastly the secularist will appeal to the rights of the mother. And in situations where the life of the mother is in danger, then this becomes relevant. Other than that though, your rights end where the rights of another begin, and the right to life trumps the right to choose.
I've always found it peculiar that the abortion issue is often fought along religious lines, or is at least perceived to be. Pro-life, anti-abortionists should be able to find allies in all walks of life, and across spiritual divides. I think this fact is illustrated well in Christopher Hitchens. He is of course a militant atheist, fervently anti- all things God, but he believes that abortion is wrong on materialist grounds (presumably arriving at that conclusion using some line of reasoning similar to what I have presented).
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