While the ground sought by modernity proved to be elusive, thereby yielding the postmodern critique of modernity, the Christian claim to reality welcomes the postmodern critique. Not so that our particular metanarrative can sit comfortably alongside other metanarratives and live in harmony with them, but because our metanarrative is comparatively so robust, so compelling, so sensible and necessary in the light of all relevant experiential and evidential data -- in other words so beautiful. Strict relativism is an illegitimate position to deduce from the premises of postmodernity; the fact that there exist a plethora of metanarratives -- none of which can be its own objectively justified grounding -- does not mean that all metanarratives are of equal value or quality, or that one can't be present which is the metanarrative that supersedes and subsumes all other metanarratives. Christian truth, properly understood, always has been a rhetoric which presents itself aesthetically, first and foremost. The truth of Christianity can't be divorced from its beauty.
None of this is a concession that the object of Christian worship, the Triune God of the Bible, is anything (or really Anyone) less than absolute Truth, only that He can't be conclusively shown to be such in the interaction between finite minds (some currently imbued with the Holy Spirit and some not). Instead it's to say that the vibrancy and beauty of the Christian metanarrative, and the relative impoverishment of all others, is a signpost that points to the probable Truth of the Christian claim. Or, more precisely, that its truth and beauty have a dialectic relationship which testifies to its supremacy over all other metanarratives. Claims that some other rhetoric has comparable or greater force I dismiss, not out of hand, but out of the knowledge obtained in my investigation of the matter. If there really is no Capital-T Truth, then beauty will ultimately only be in the eye of the beholder, of course, and then those alternate claims are just as valid as mine; but if Truth is out there, then that Truth will be Beauty itself, and it becomes possible for one rhetoric to rise above and absorb all others into itself. The postmodern turn in philosophy doesn't answer the question of whether Truth is out there, but only says that there is no dispassionate, objective position we can occupy to access this knowledge and demonstrate that we have done so. The latter postulate is what seems to be forgotten often.
Incidentally, even some highly influential non-theist thinkers such as Hegel -- and some contemporary Hegelians, such as Slavoj Zizek -- seem to accept the supremacy of Christian rhetoric. While they don't make the move that I do here -- claiming that the nonpareil beauty of the Christian rhetoric is an overwhelming testament to its Truth -- they do affirm its beauty and its potency as a means for understanding the world.
As I've hinted at, modernity need not remain entirely silent on this issue; the popularized version of the postmodern triumph in epistemology and philosophy is a catastrophist model, meaning that it envisions postmodernity counteracting modernity and overturning it; in reality the postmodern project was really inaugurated within modernity all along, and postmodernity is really just its consummation. With this in mind, the internal coherence of the Christian story can still be examined by traditionally modern methods, and how well (or poorly) it fairs under such scrutiny will testify for (or against) its Beauty, which in turn will comment on its claim to Truth. If it patently fails, for example, this would obviously severely cripple its aesthetic appeal; conversely, if it stands up as well as can be expected, this fact either acts as an element of the rhetoric of the Christian story itself, or at least something that acts as an adjacent support structure for it.
With this position laid out, the only task that remains is actually presenting the rhetoric in question. Though it's of course too large a task for this trifle of a post, or for any individual, I can at least point you to the location of the current development of that rhetoric, which is Christ's church on Earth, inhabited and empowered by the Holy Spirit. The church, the Body of Christ, is a furthering of the rhetoric which begins with the loving God of creation making Man in His image for His pleasure, and then reconciling the fallen world to Himself through Christ, the second person of the Trinity. This is, of course, a terribly inadequate thumbnail sketch of the totality of the staggering beauty of Christian rhetoric, which can only be fully appreciated by partaking in that rhetoric, but can also be seen (to some degree) from the outside, if approached humbly, thoughtfully, and prayerfully.
My (self-imposed) task here wasn't to demonstrate the beauty of the rhetoric itself -- though I do earnestly implore anyone reading to investigate the matter for themselves -- but only to make the case that, within a postmodern framework, Beauty becomes a primary concern which can present a more powerful and potent case for one metanarrative's supremacy over others, which in turn can become an argument for its Truth.
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This post was inspired entirely by David Bentley Hart's Beauty of the Infinite. I make no claims to originality, but my thoughts on this subject were flitting through my head and asking to be transcribed in my own words.
Showing posts with label postmodernism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label postmodernism. Show all posts
Monday, February 20, 2012
Monday, June 21, 2010
In Defense of Modern Epistemology
Let me begin by clarifying that I don't intend this defense of modernity to extend to every ideal, precept, or especially consequence of modernity. Indeed, many of those I find deplorable, inane or undesirable in various respects. This particular defense is only of the epistemological sort. My assertion is that, contrary to the movement in epistemology toward postmodernism, there is nothing wrong with modernity's scientific rationalism and verificationism, such as it is.
The perceived flaw in modernity's epistemology is largely just that; a (mis)perception. The central 'revolutionary' contribution of postmodernism to epistemology, which is supposed to wholly undercut modernity, is essentially the idea that modernity's scientific rationalism itself is built upon various unverifiable (and unfalsifiable) presuppositions and contingencies. Therefore, if the most 'objective' and 'rational' system of verification is itself not inherently rational or subject to verification, then verificationism as a whole must be without merit or import.
Presented in this way this argument reads very much like a modern rejection of modernity itself. Which is to say that postmodernism seeks to undercut modern epistemology using modern epistemology. Or, put another way: "There's no way to truly know anything, but we know modernity is wrong." Thereby reducing the contributions of postmodernism to nonsense.
Ignoring this irony for a moment, there is a problem with the argument itself. The premises are indeed all quite true, but the conclusion does not follow from those premises. Which is to say that modernity already understood the epistemological qualifications that postmodernism supposedly brought to light, and modernity had already fully accounted for and integrated these qualifications into it's systems of verification. At no point did modernity operate under the pretense that scientific rationalism necessarily revealed absolute truth (although many modern men may have), rather only that it could verify or falsify particular truths given a specific set of presuppositions, and operating within a particular framework. Thus postmodernism has contributed nothing to epistemology that modernity, properly understood, didn't already adequately incorporate within itself.
That doesn't mean that all conclusions of modernity are absolutely valid. On the contrary, modernism recognizes it's inherent limits. Limits that the postmodern movement arrogantly, and errantly, believes that it's exposing. Certainly any who took the advances of modernity and interpreted them in such a way to conclude, for example, that individual will is the utmost virtue, or that the only virtue is the annihilation of virtue, have taken the valid findings of modernity and misunderstood their implications. These conclusions do not flow inexorably from modern epistemology or it's findings. Granted, such misinterpretations are fairly widespread, but this fact does not undermine the validity of modern epistemology itself. It only goes to demonstrate that many modern peoples don't comprehend modernity or it's consequences.
Apart from the actual validity of postmodern epistemology, I also find the idea that there has been a massive epistemological shift in American culture, or in the "collective conscious", toward the postmodern to be a specious claim. People who tend to make this argument do so when looking at humanity from a broad perspective, as a collective, rather than as a sum of individuals. From the former perspective it's understandable how one could reach such a conclusion, as there are macro-scale changes in society that might suggest that this is the case (the explosion of the internet and all of it's epistemological consequences, for example). From the latter perspective, however, the claim seems to lack any support. While the culture itself might be experiencing a particular shift that does not necessarily mean that the individuals within that culture are shifting in the same direction. Or, if they are, not necessarily in direct proportion to the massive cultural shifts (that is; there may have been a minor, not major, shift). Culture is not merely an equitably weighted sum of all the perspectives contained therein, and even if it were that, our society and culture would remain decidedly modern. If postmodernism was as pervasive a cultural influence as some claim, people would live their lives very differently than they actually do live them.
To conclude I want to reiterate the disclaimer at the opening of this piece: my defense of modern epistemology is not a defense of modernity in total. There are many aspects of modernity worthy of decrying, epistemology just isn't one of those things.
The perceived flaw in modernity's epistemology is largely just that; a (mis)perception. The central 'revolutionary' contribution of postmodernism to epistemology, which is supposed to wholly undercut modernity, is essentially the idea that modernity's scientific rationalism itself is built upon various unverifiable (and unfalsifiable) presuppositions and contingencies. Therefore, if the most 'objective' and 'rational' system of verification is itself not inherently rational or subject to verification, then verificationism as a whole must be without merit or import.
Presented in this way this argument reads very much like a modern rejection of modernity itself. Which is to say that postmodernism seeks to undercut modern epistemology using modern epistemology. Or, put another way: "There's no way to truly know anything, but we know modernity is wrong." Thereby reducing the contributions of postmodernism to nonsense.
Ignoring this irony for a moment, there is a problem with the argument itself. The premises are indeed all quite true, but the conclusion does not follow from those premises. Which is to say that modernity already understood the epistemological qualifications that postmodernism supposedly brought to light, and modernity had already fully accounted for and integrated these qualifications into it's systems of verification. At no point did modernity operate under the pretense that scientific rationalism necessarily revealed absolute truth (although many modern men may have), rather only that it could verify or falsify particular truths given a specific set of presuppositions, and operating within a particular framework. Thus postmodernism has contributed nothing to epistemology that modernity, properly understood, didn't already adequately incorporate within itself.
That doesn't mean that all conclusions of modernity are absolutely valid. On the contrary, modernism recognizes it's inherent limits. Limits that the postmodern movement arrogantly, and errantly, believes that it's exposing. Certainly any who took the advances of modernity and interpreted them in such a way to conclude, for example, that individual will is the utmost virtue, or that the only virtue is the annihilation of virtue, have taken the valid findings of modernity and misunderstood their implications. These conclusions do not flow inexorably from modern epistemology or it's findings. Granted, such misinterpretations are fairly widespread, but this fact does not undermine the validity of modern epistemology itself. It only goes to demonstrate that many modern peoples don't comprehend modernity or it's consequences.
Apart from the actual validity of postmodern epistemology, I also find the idea that there has been a massive epistemological shift in American culture, or in the "collective conscious", toward the postmodern to be a specious claim. People who tend to make this argument do so when looking at humanity from a broad perspective, as a collective, rather than as a sum of individuals. From the former perspective it's understandable how one could reach such a conclusion, as there are macro-scale changes in society that might suggest that this is the case (the explosion of the internet and all of it's epistemological consequences, for example). From the latter perspective, however, the claim seems to lack any support. While the culture itself might be experiencing a particular shift that does not necessarily mean that the individuals within that culture are shifting in the same direction. Or, if they are, not necessarily in direct proportion to the massive cultural shifts (that is; there may have been a minor, not major, shift). Culture is not merely an equitably weighted sum of all the perspectives contained therein, and even if it were that, our society and culture would remain decidedly modern. If postmodernism was as pervasive a cultural influence as some claim, people would live their lives very differently than they actually do live them.
To conclude I want to reiterate the disclaimer at the opening of this piece: my defense of modern epistemology is not a defense of modernity in total. There are many aspects of modernity worthy of decrying, epistemology just isn't one of those things.
Monday, June 14, 2010
Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and... N.T. Wright? - On Postmodernism
Pat Robertson and the late Jerry Falwell often grabbed the spotlight of the media and drew the ire of their political and social opponents, as well as from many fellow Christians (undoubtedly amongst them liberal theologians such as N.T. Wright), when they made pronouncements about what they believe to be God's judgment. Such as when they made the claims that Katrina was God's judgment upon homosexuals, or 9-11 was God's judgment on America for it's sinfulness. Such statements are, for the most part, rightly renounced by the public. The key fallacy behind such statements is that they arrogantly presume to know God's will.
I stumbled on an old article by N.T. Wright yesterday on postmodernity and the proposed response for the church. As usual his Biblical scholarship is exquisite. He goes over the story of Christ visiting the disciples in Luke after his death and breaking bread with them before vanishing. He tells it with "musical accompaniment" from one of the Psalms. He goes on to describe the moment when the disciples realize who Christ is and their eyes become open, and juxtaposes it with a moment in Genesis after the fall when Adam and Eve's eyes become closed. All quite brilliant stuff.
What does any of that have to do with postmodernity and how we should respond to it? I'm not quite sure. He makes some allusions to how the two connect, but honestly it seems like he should have separated this into two different articles. The opening and closing of this piece are on postmodernity and the church, while the center is a piece of Biblical scholarship that seems to me mostly disconnected from the introduction and the conclusion. It's possible I'm just being obtuse but, in any case, I didn't really follow him here.
What struck me as particularly odd was Wright's claim that postmodernity is an outworking of God's judgment on the arrogance of modernity. How is such a claim, where Wright claims to know the will of God and claims that a particular event is the result of his judgment, fundamentally different from the types of statements made by Falwell and Robertson? My assertion is that there is no difference. Wright's claim is more cerebral and abstract, and it doesn't cynically play on tragedy, but the key fallacy is identical. Even if Wright were as visible a public figure as the other two, undoubtedly his statement would not strike people as being offensive because, again, it's more cerebral (a lot fewer people would even know what he's talking about), and because in this example Wright is claiming an extremely broad, general judgment that applies to the whole of mankind. Where Falwell and Robertson's statements claimed to know when God was judging specific sub-sets of humanity. Nevertheless, the underlying fallacy is the same.
As a second, mostly unrelated point, Wright's acceptance of postmodernity itself seems to be made on grounds that appear to be quite modern. His entire method of critique that he employs for evaluating postmodernity--wherein he concludes that we should not fear it but embrace it--is itself based in wholly modern epistemology. For example, he states with a great deal of certitude that "what we must not do, I believe, is pretend [postmodernity] hasn't really happened." But, if postmodernity does in fact hold sway, then there's really nothing that we must not do. Indeed, such a claim belongs to the arrogance of modernity which he has already renounced.
Wright goes on to assert that there are "no such thing as bare facts", and that postmodernity has revealed this to be the case. In other words he claims that it's a fact that there are no facts.
Directly after stating that postmodernity has undermined the validity of all "metanarratives", revealing them to be mere power games, he proceeds to introduce a coherent, linear metanarrative of his own which culminates in his revealing postmodernity to be a judgment upon mankind, and he expects us to accept his own metanarrative as valid and important.
Such is the absurdity of postmodernity.
I suppose within the nihilistic constructs of postmodernity you can create metanarratives while simultaneously denouncing metanarratives as inherently meaningless. You can make heavy-handed pronouncements about things that we "must" do, while simultaneously asserting that postmodernity has revealed that we need not do anything in particular. You can reject the arrogance of modernity while arrogantly, modern-ly asserting that modernity is dead, and that it's death is the result of God's judgment.
I stumbled on an old article by N.T. Wright yesterday on postmodernity and the proposed response for the church. As usual his Biblical scholarship is exquisite. He goes over the story of Christ visiting the disciples in Luke after his death and breaking bread with them before vanishing. He tells it with "musical accompaniment" from one of the Psalms. He goes on to describe the moment when the disciples realize who Christ is and their eyes become open, and juxtaposes it with a moment in Genesis after the fall when Adam and Eve's eyes become closed. All quite brilliant stuff.
What does any of that have to do with postmodernity and how we should respond to it? I'm not quite sure. He makes some allusions to how the two connect, but honestly it seems like he should have separated this into two different articles. The opening and closing of this piece are on postmodernity and the church, while the center is a piece of Biblical scholarship that seems to me mostly disconnected from the introduction and the conclusion. It's possible I'm just being obtuse but, in any case, I didn't really follow him here.
What struck me as particularly odd was Wright's claim that postmodernity is an outworking of God's judgment on the arrogance of modernity. How is such a claim, where Wright claims to know the will of God and claims that a particular event is the result of his judgment, fundamentally different from the types of statements made by Falwell and Robertson? My assertion is that there is no difference. Wright's claim is more cerebral and abstract, and it doesn't cynically play on tragedy, but the key fallacy is identical. Even if Wright were as visible a public figure as the other two, undoubtedly his statement would not strike people as being offensive because, again, it's more cerebral (a lot fewer people would even know what he's talking about), and because in this example Wright is claiming an extremely broad, general judgment that applies to the whole of mankind. Where Falwell and Robertson's statements claimed to know when God was judging specific sub-sets of humanity. Nevertheless, the underlying fallacy is the same.
As a second, mostly unrelated point, Wright's acceptance of postmodernity itself seems to be made on grounds that appear to be quite modern. His entire method of critique that he employs for evaluating postmodernity--wherein he concludes that we should not fear it but embrace it--is itself based in wholly modern epistemology. For example, he states with a great deal of certitude that "what we must not do, I believe, is pretend [postmodernity] hasn't really happened." But, if postmodernity does in fact hold sway, then there's really nothing that we must not do. Indeed, such a claim belongs to the arrogance of modernity which he has already renounced.
Wright goes on to assert that there are "no such thing as bare facts", and that postmodernity has revealed this to be the case. In other words he claims that it's a fact that there are no facts.
Directly after stating that postmodernity has undermined the validity of all "metanarratives", revealing them to be mere power games, he proceeds to introduce a coherent, linear metanarrative of his own which culminates in his revealing postmodernity to be a judgment upon mankind, and he expects us to accept his own metanarrative as valid and important.
Such is the absurdity of postmodernity.
I suppose within the nihilistic constructs of postmodernity you can create metanarratives while simultaneously denouncing metanarratives as inherently meaningless. You can make heavy-handed pronouncements about things that we "must" do, while simultaneously asserting that postmodernity has revealed that we need not do anything in particular. You can reject the arrogance of modernity while arrogantly, modern-ly asserting that modernity is dead, and that it's death is the result of God's judgment.
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