Thursday, March 1, 2012

More on Peter Boghossian and Faith

My previous post on Peter Boghossian's talk titled Jesus, The Easter Bunny and Other Delusions was written on the basis of an interview he did, and on a description of the talk that he gave. His talk has since been made available online, and I've watched the whole thing. After watching it, I think my criticism from the initial post holds up just fine, and represents the most central problem with his thesis. But the details of his presentation brought up a few other issues.

To briefly reiterate my chief problem with the thesis of the talk that "Faith is an unreliable process". The point that I made is that the thesis is irrelevantly true. A person of faith can easily concede the point that "faith" in general, as a process, is not reliable. After all, a Christian does not believe that faith in Buddha, or Allah, or Krishna will do anything for you; indeed a Christian would hold that faith in such things is guaranteed to lead you astray, and so would concede that "faith" in general is not reliable.  People of faith don't have faith-in-faith, they have faith in specific gods. Boghossian's argument proceeds in such a way that assumes if he can demonstrate the unreliability of faith in general, as a process, that this should cause a person of faith to abandon their faith, but this expectation commits the fallacy of division; it can be true that faith in general is an unreliable process and that a faith properly-oriented, faith in the One True God, is entirely reliable. This lone objection is pretty much fatal for Professor Boghossian's entire project.

Boghossian's main examples to demonstrate the unreliability of faith, such as faith healing and transubstantiation, are really extra-biblical tenets that are not -- and never were -- central elements of the Christian faith. And so nothing at all hinges upon their standing or falling, and if and when they do 'fall', that fact mitigates against the reliability of faith in the Christian God not at all.

 Another problem with his thesis is that, in a somewhat subtle manner, it assumes a priori that various faiths are wrong. That is to say, if it were true that there is no supernatural reality, or that faith is unreliable at apprehending supernatural reality, then the conclusion that faith (or specific faiths) are dispensable is obvious enough, but no argument has been made. If, however, some faith is substantially correct in all of its claims about transcendent reality, then not only would that particular faith be reliable, but it would be reliable at determining the most important facts about reality, facts which are much more substantial than the truths that modern science reveals about immanent, empirical reality. The fact that this can't be demonstrated to be the case is, of course, unproblematic for people of faith. That's entailed by the definition of faith and the nature of the things it aims to apprehend.

Speaking of the definition of faith, Boghossian largely defines himself a victory by using this definition of faith: "Belief without evidence". If this is how you're defining the term then, again, it's not difficult to get to a place where faith is unreliable. The problem is that you've produced a tautological argument that doesn't say anything. When faith is defined as unreliable, it is in fact unreliable. Of course, Christian faith (for one example) explicitly invokes evidence in its definition of "faith" (Hebrews 11:1), and would reject this concept of "faith", which is only another reason that speaking about "faith" in general terms produces such vacuous results.

And, even outside of the Christian concept of faith, on secular grounds, faith is most often invoked, not as something that goes contrary to evidence, or completely without reference to it, but in line with it. For example, if you have faith that your brother will make it to an appointment with you on time, you base this faith on the fact that your brother has been consistently reliable in the past. You can't be certain that he will prove reliable again, as that remains to be seen, and so you ground your faith in him in the evidence that is available and pertinent. With this much more sensible, realistic understanding of faith in view -- rather than Boghossian's silly definition -- again, his project crumbles.

Also, pointing out that faith is not well-suited to answering narrow questions about immanent, material reality is of about as much consequence as pointing out that biology is ill-suited to answering questions on astronomy. Using Boghossian's methodology of argument, one could argue quite forcefully that biology fails horribly at answering 9 out of 10 different types of questions, it just happens to excel at answering biological questions. Biology is, therefore, an unreliable process. Q.E.D.

At one point in the presentation Boghossian makes the claim that all conversations on the topic of someone's faith inevitably results in the person moving the goal posts, and shifting their claim from "my faith is true" to "my faith is beneficial". Perhaps he was being hyperbolic but he claims that "This is the inevitable trajectory of every single conversation, period." Every single conversation, period? I've had dozens of such conversations, and I can't recall a single one even drifting slightly in this direction, and I could produce the testimony of my interlocutors to confirm that the conversations never go in this direction. And I doubt that I'm the lone exception to this rule.

In closing, let me draw attention to one piece of the presentation that I found somewhat helpful. At one juncture, professor Boghossian encourages his audience to criticize ideas and not people. As a pragmatic concern, if you're trying to convince people of something, attacking them will never be very fruitful. This struck me as a secular version of "hate the sin, love the sinner", which made me chuckle a bit to realize.

30 comments:

  1. "This struck me as a secular version of "hate the sin, love the sinner", which made me chuckle a bit to realize."

    No, it's just reason.

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  2. "it can be true that faith in general is an unreliable process and that a faith properly-oriented, faith in the One True God, is entirely reliable. This lone objection is pretty much fatal for Professor Boghossian's entire project. "

    So your arguement is basically that if you just happen to have faith in the right god, your faith is reliable? Having the proper result (and I'm not granting that their is any true god to believe in) does not mean that the method used to get that result is reliable. It just means you're lucky. Do you think most lottery winners have reliable strategies for guessing winning numbers?

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    1. I wouldn't argue that it's "luck" in a way (I believe that it is God's grace, and not my own merit that makes me justified). But the point is more about what a faith properly-oriented does AFTER you have the faith. That is: it can (theoretically) reliably produce true belief, even if faith in general as a process can not.

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    2. I get what you're trying to say, but in the context of Boghossian's argument, we're talking about discovering truth, not what we do with the truth once we discover it.

      But even considering what happens after you have faith, does faith actually help you increase the amount of truth you know once you have it, or does it bias your process of judging what is true? I know from my own experience what faith leads one to believe can certainly feel true, but at least for me, that all broke down once I examined my beliefs rationally and with intellectual honesty.

      Perhaps faith can motivate you to search out truth. If your god happens to actually exist, then perhaps faith can motivate you to find out more about him. But even then, it's a motivator, and not otherwise a proper part of the process. If faith is a motivator to seek out truth, can you seek truth without faith biasing the process?

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    3. Boghossian's project was about demonstrating that faith is an unreliable process. The only way this makes sense is to look at the results of those who actually *have* faith. It's about whether those faiths (when actually engaged in) reliably produce true belief.

      "But even considering what happens after you have faith, does faith actually help you increase the amount of truth you know once you have it, or does it bias your process of judging what is true?"

      I'd ague a faith properly oriented (true Christian faith, in my view), does the former and all other faith does something more like the latter. But the question of what "faith" itself does -- if we agree, for example, that it's more likely to bias someone away from the truth in general -- this conclusion won't bother a person of faith at all. And so, even if you can demonstrate it to be the case, the failure to distinguish between the general and the particular is an intractable problem for the project. The faithful can affirm your conclusion and still be devoutly faithful, without contradiction.

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    4. "The only way this makes sense is to look at the results of those who actually *have* faith."

      I believe that's what he's done. His description of faith certainly matches my own observations about the faith of others and the faith I once had. I once thought I had an evidence-based faith, but I realized I was fooling myself. My faith distorted my perspective and caused me to try to make data fit my world view rather than basing my world view on data.

      "It's about whether those faiths (when actually engaged in) reliably produce true belief. " Yes, and I don't see evidence that faiths accomplish that regardless of engagement.

      "I'd ague a faith properly oriented (true Christian faith, in my view), does the former and all other faith does something more like the latter." Feel free to present a case for this. (Not intended as a smarmy comment)

      "But the question of what "faith" itself does -- if we agree, for example, that it's more likely to bias someone away from the truth in general -- this conclusion won't bother a person of faith at all." It should bother them.

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    5. "It should bother them" - But why? What vested interest do I have in 'faith' as a person of faith? I have a vested interest in faith-in-Christ, that it's reliable, but not in 'faith'. I can affirm that faith in general is not reliable and retain my faith without the slightest contradiction.

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    6. If your beliefs are based on something that is unreliable, it should cause you to question the veracity of your beliefs. Then again, if your faith isn't causing you to support political opinions that hold back society, and your not planning on blowing up abortion clinics or any of that stuff, maybe it's not a huge concern for you if your beliefs are accurate or not. *shrugs*

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    7. "If your beliefs are based on something that is unreliable, it should cause you to question the veracity of your beliefs." - Certainly. And I can affirm that "faith" (in general) is unreliable, while claiming that faith-in-Christ (in specific) is reliable. And I can do so without the slightest contradiction. Hence, even affirming the critique against "faith" in general as valid, it need not bother a person of faith in the slightest. Because no one has faith-in-faith.

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  3. "Boghossian's main examples to demonstrate the unreliability of faith, such as faith healing and transubstantiation, are really extra-biblical tenets that are not -- and never were -- central elements of the Christian faith."

    Was he targeting your specific faith, or faith in general?

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    1. Faith in general. And if successfully attacking faith in general leaves all specific faiths unmolested, as it does, then what's the point?

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    2. Does it? If I dig a hole in my back yard and find 100 ounces of gold, would that mean randomly picking places to dig for gold would be a reliable means for finding gold?

      (Once again, simply for the sake of argument allowing the possibility that faith could ever lead to a true belief in a deity or whatever)

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  4. While I might can understand how you might distinguish how your faith doesn't fall under his stated definition (though I'm guessing it actually does), I don't see why you criticize him for providing one. Why should a speaker not clarify what he means by a term, especially a term that is often semantically fuzzy?

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  5. "Of course, Christian faith (for one example) explicitly invokes evidence in its definition of "faith" (Hebrews 11:1)" I don't understand how this verse describes evidential faith. Perhaps there's something I'm missing. Please explain. (Not a smarmy statement but a sincere request)

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  6. "And, even outside of the Christian concept of faith, on secular grounds,..." This paragraph basically confirms the need for him to specify what he meant by faith. Personally, I don't regard giving various assertions degrees of probably being true the same as faith, but I understand some people do. Your bias makes you want to disparage his definition, but his definition is quite useful. If you think his definition doesn't apply to your faith, then fine (though many would be skeptical of such a claim). His definition comes about because there ARE those who hold on to their faith knowing the evidence contradicts their beliefs. His definition is useful.

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    1. My issue isn't that he defined his terms, of course, but only that he chose the definition that he did. If you illegitimately define your position into the conclusion of your argument, then your argument will always be uninteresting or unconvincing.

      "Skepticism is an unreliable process. Skepticism is disbelief in something at all costs, even when the evidence is in favor of it." If you accept my definition, then I can easily make the case that skepticism is an unreliable process. It just won't mean anything because you won't accept my definition and you have no reason to.

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    2. "If you illegitimately define your position into the conclusion of your argument" Did he do that? His definition of faith seems to match how it's often used. People often use faith, as he defined it, as the foundation of their beliefs. Whether or not his argument is interesting is a subjective matter, but to me, it's quite solid and certainly interesting enough.

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    3. "Skepticism is an unreliable process..." I see your point, but the problem with your point is I really don't see this definition of skepticism being generally valid or valid at all except in the extreme special cases. Your definition of skepticism doesn't in any way resemble the general case of how it's used. Of course, this is part of your point, but, I believe Boghossian's definition of faith agrees well with how it's generally used or at the very worst it agrees with how it's often used.

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    4. I think the definition of skepticism is a bad caricature of what skepticism really is, and I think the same is true with how Peter defines faith. If something even close to 51% of faithful people themselves agreed upon such a definition, then I'd start to take it serious, but virtually no one who has faith defines it in such a way, and so it's not a definition that can lead to any kind of fruitful dialogue. It's just a rhetorical battering ram with the conclusion pre-determined.

      It's alluring because it gestures toward what faith really is, but it's overly simplistic and it paints a false picture. i.e. implying that the faithful often (if ever) invoke faith on matters where evidence is or even could be conclusive. Rather than the real situation, which is that faith is almost solely invoked with regard to matters that reason and evidence can't adjudicate. So, to me, there's a big difference in saying "belief without evidence", and "belief on matters that inherently must go beyond evidence".

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    5. "but virtually no one who has faith defines it in such a way" I think this is false. I suppose without hard data, we'll be at an impasse on this issue. But even among the faithful who would not accept such a definition, if one were to examine the nature of their faith, I believe many or most would have a faith that fits Boghossian's definition.

      "implying that the faithful often (if ever) invoke faith on matters where evidence is or even could be conclusive." It happens time and time again, especially among fundamentalists.

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  7. "Also, pointing out that faith is not well-suited to answering narrow questions about immanent, material reality is of about as much consequence as pointing out that biology is ill-suited to answering questions on astronomy."

    This metaphor doesn't work for me. Biology makes no claims about astronomy. Various faiths DO make claims about objective reality. Of course, some faiths try to make some silly distinction between objective reality and spiritual reality.

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    1. No, faiths with almost no exceptions, make any claim to be able to compete with science on answering narrow questions about immanent, material reality. That's precisely the point. About "objective reality" yes, but that isn't the analogy I made.

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    2. Vast quantities of scientific knowledge are dismissed through the willful ignorance engendered by faith. Time and time again, people will dismiss science when it conflicts with their faith. Of course, while it may or may not generally be the case (I don't have data to say it is), I know it's not universally the case.

      Kennith Miller, a biologist who is helping spearhead the fight against teaching creationism in school, is a devout catholic who somehow reconciles his religion with what he knows about science. But he is intellectually honest enough to understand that knowledge discovered by science is more probably true than his faith-based beliefs. Apparently, the Dalai Lama (please forgive my spelling) has a similar view. While I see no value in their faith, I can respect the degree to which they are intellectually honest. Still, they do not seem to represent a general case for the faithful.

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    3. "Vast quantities of scientific knowledge are dismissed through the willful ignorance engendered by faith. Time and time again, people will dismiss science when it conflicts with their faith."

      I don't see how the extent to which this is true is any indictment against faith, though, rather than an indictment of those people for being obstinate or ignorant or whatever. If people deny reality in the name of their faith, that is a bad thing (essentially, it's fundamentalism). But the faithful can despise fundamentalism as easily as the non-faithful do. I don't see the point.

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    4. The point is that faith is innocuous at best and often is huge stumbling block to rational thought. Sure, one might can find cases where faith is ultimately psychologically beneficial to some, but the net effect of faith is that it holds society back. In general, it compromises our ability to think rationally. Even when it seems innocouous, it often causes people to make sacrifices in this life for an afterlife that will never happen. It causes people to hold horrible political positions. Think what a stumbling block faith is to stem cell research, for example.

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  8. "At one point in the presentation Boghossian makes the claim that all conversations on the topic of someone's faith inevitably results in the person moving the goal posts, and shifting their claim from "my faith is true" to "my faith is beneficial"."

    Whether or not it happens every time, this DOES happen a lot. A Bill O'Reilly clip comes immediately to mind.

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  9. This is a reply to a comment you made higher up (the 'reply' button below it isn't working):

    "Does it? If I dig a hole in my back yard and find 100 ounces of gold, would that mean randomly picking places to dig for gold would be a reliable means for finding gold?"

    I'm not sure you understood my point. I'm conceding that 'faith' in general is an unreliable process, and claiming that it's possible that while faith in general is unreliable, a particular faith is reliable. In which case the beliefs that are the fruits of that faith would not be because of luck, but because that particular god really exists and supernaturally endows his followers with true belief. I don't need to demonstrate this is actually the case to make my point, only that it's possible. If it's possible, then even a *successful* critique of faith in general need not sway a faithful person from their faith.

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    1. So you're basically saying, if a god plants faith in your mind, that faith is reliable? In such a case, one might argue that faith isn't a process to find truth but rather a result of truth being implanted. Otherwise, I'd say that producing the desired result isn't the same as proof of reliability.

      So if any god endows those who seek him with a knowledge of him/her/them/etc., then why do so many seekers come up with varying results? How does one distinguish between being endowed by a god with a truth and simply fooling themselves or being fooled by others? Why are the results of seeking truth based more on geography than the degree of effort in searching?

      "This is a reply to a comment you made higher up (the 'reply' button below it isn't working):" Heheheh, I know what you mean. Forum software can be frustrating sometimes.

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  10. So what you're saying is that there is one faith that is better than all the others? That seems to be your case here.

    If so, then make it to an atheist: upon what grounds (having no faith) could I possibly determine that your favored faith is more likely to adhere to the truth than any others?

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    1. El Bruce,

      That's a poor distillation of my point, but it's a vague gesture in the correct direction of what my point is. As to your request that I make a case for my faith above others, I can do that, but before I do, you must concede that the issue of being able to make my case for a particular faith TO OTHERS, has nothing to do with whether or not a particular faith can be possibly reliable, even while 'faith' in general can not, right? Meaning, even if you find my case on behalf of my faith to be utterly unconvincing, no part of my argument made here will be untrue or even slightly challenged.

      In other words, before we embark on the tangent, I want to make sure you're conceding the actual point I've been making up until now.. and if you're not, then why are we embarking on a tangent?

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