Atheist Delusions - Short Review

I recently concluded the phenomenal Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and it's Fashionable Enemies by David Bentley Hart. The title gives the impression that it would be an all-out polemic, and in a certain sense it is. However the vast majority of the book focuses on a few central claims made by atheists and proceeds to dismantle them in such extreme historical detail that the focus shifts away from the arguments being refuted to the history itself. The subtitle of the book should probably be the title; the book is much more about the Christian revolution within Western history than it is about it's enemies. Though it does use those enemies as a jumping off point, essentially structuring the book as a response to various critiques, and juxtaposing these (mostly amateur, petulant) modern critiques to the, in some ways, much more sophisticated and legitimate critiques of great unbelievers of the past, most notably Nietzsche. Who, Hart claims, was one of the few who actually understood the gravity of exactly what it was he was opposing, and all the associated consequences. Whereas modern critics want to blithely reject Christianity while unknowingly clinging to it's moral remnants, despite rejecting the foundation that morality is built upon. Or they choose to cherish the scientific method above all else failing to recognize that it was only out of Christian societies that "science", as we understand it, came into being.

Hart goes into extensive historical detail revealing the ways in which the modern, secular narrative of Christianity's rise and influence over Western culture can not be adequately explained in the ways that many of the critics attempt to make sense of it. Hart examines in detail the ways in which these critic's narratives of Christianity in Western history i.e the "dark ages" of religion, virtuous paganism stamped out by dogmatic Christianity, burning of books, Christian suppression of science and intellectual advancement, "religious wars", and the light of secular modernity which saved us from all these etc. are either pure fictions, or are not exclusively or primarily attributable to Christianity and it's ideals (despite whatever extent they were attributable to Christians.)

He then goes on to give a detailed historical account of that which the modern critics, for the most part, don't even care to address or acknowledge; that being the unique, monumental, moral revolution in society attributable solely to Christianity. A moral revolution which we as modern peoples are heirs of, and which these same critics wholeheartedly embrace as a "humanism", unawares that such a "humanism" only became knowable, or even intelligible, through Christianity.

Though the whole book is aimed at rejecting certain arguments by atheists and secularists, Hart goes into such detail you sometimes lose sight of what argument it is he is refuting, and get immersed in a simple history of Christianity and the West. Which is fascinating stuff in it's own right, but the book excels the most when it focuses on it's targets (illegitimate, ignorant critiques of Christianity) and dismantles them. In these sections Hart is mercilessly acerbic, and it's truly beautiful stuff.

Atheist Delusions lays bare most of the conceits of the so-called 'New Atheists' handily, and without wasting space. No energy is expended attempting to exhaustively refute every claim of the 'New Atheists', many of which are irrelevantly true. Hart instead focuses on those that, if they were true, would be pretty devastating, and reveals them to be demonstrably false. All the while providing a thorough, illuminating perspective on the history of Christianity in Western culture and it's revolutionary nature.

Style footnote: Hart's prose is mostly excellent and very fun to read, though he at times sacrifices some degree of readability for overly ornate language.

Footnote #2: This article, which came out after his book, is what got me interested in the author's work. And it's on the same subject as the book, so check that out if you want an idea of what the book is like.

In Defense of Modern Epistemology

Let me begin by clarifying that I don't intend this defense of modernity to extend to every ideal, precept, or especially consequence of modernity. Indeed, many of those I find deplorable, inane or undesirable in various respects. This particular defense is only of the epistemological sort. My assertion is that, contrary to the movement in epistemology toward postmodernism, there is nothing wrong with modernity's scientific rationalism and verificationism, such as it is.

The perceived flaw in modernity's epistemology is largely just that; a (mis)perception. The central 'revolutionary' contribution of postmodernism to epistemology, which is supposed to wholly undercut modernity, is essentially the idea that modernity's scientific rationalism itself is built upon various unverifiable (and unfalsifiable) presuppositions and contingencies. Therefore, if the most 'objective' and 'rational' system of verification is itself not inherently rational or subject to verification, then verificationism as a whole must be without merit or import.

Presented in this way this argument reads very much like a modern rejection of modernity itself. Which is to say that postmodernism seeks to undercut modern epistemology using modern epistemology. Or, put another way: "There's no way to truly know anything, but we know modernity is wrong." Thereby reducing the contributions of postmodernism to nonsense.

Ignoring this irony for a moment, there is a problem with the argument itself. The premises are indeed all quite true, but the conclusion does not follow from those premises. Which is to say that modernity already understood the epistemological qualifications that postmodernism supposedly brought to light, and modernity had already fully accounted for and integrated these qualifications into it's systems of verification. At no point did modernity operate under the pretense that scientific rationalism necessarily revealed absolute truth (although many modern men may have), rather only that it could verify or falsify particular truths given a specific set of presuppositions, and operating within a particular framework. Thus postmodernism has contributed nothing to epistemology that modernity, properly understood, didn't already adequately incorporate within itself.

That doesn't mean that all conclusions of modernity are absolutely valid. On the contrary, modernism recognizes it's inherent limits. Limits that the postmodern movement arrogantly, and errantly, believes that it's exposing. Certainly any who took the advances of modernity and interpreted them in such a way to conclude, for example, that individual will is the utmost virtue, or that the only virtue is the annihilation of virtue, have taken the valid findings of modernity and misunderstood their implications. These conclusions do not flow inexorably from modern epistemology or it's findings. Granted, such misinterpretations are fairly widespread, but this fact does not undermine the validity of modern epistemology itself. It only goes to demonstrate that many modern peoples don't comprehend modernity or it's consequences.

Apart from the actual validity of postmodern epistemology, I also find the idea that there has been a massive epistemological shift in American culture, or in the "collective conscious", toward the postmodern to be a specious claim. People who tend to make this argument do so when looking at humanity from a broad perspective, as a collective, rather than as a sum of individuals. From the former perspective it's understandable how one could reach such a conclusion, as there are macro-scale changes in society that might suggest that this is the case (the explosion of the internet and all of it's epistemological consequences, for example). From the latter perspective, however, the claim seems to lack any support. While the culture itself might be experiencing a particular shift that does not necessarily mean that the individuals within that culture are shifting in the same direction. Or, if they are, not necessarily in direct proportion to the massive cultural shifts (that is; there may have been a minor, not major, shift). Culture is not merely an equitably weighted sum of all the perspectives contained therein, and even if it were that, our society and culture would remain decidedly modern. If postmodernism was as pervasive a cultural influence as some claim, people would live their lives very differently than they actually do live them.

To conclude I want to reiterate the disclaimer at the opening of this piece: my defense of modern epistemology is not a defense of modernity in total. There are many aspects of modernity worthy of decrying, epistemology just isn't one of those things.

Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and... N.T. Wright? - On Postmodernism

Pat Robertson and the late Jerry Falwell often grabbed the spotlight of the media and drew the ire of their political and social opponents, as well as from many fellow Christians (undoubtedly amongst them liberal theologians such as N.T. Wright), when they made pronouncements about what they believe to be God's judgment. Such as when they made the claims that Katrina was God's judgment upon homosexuals, or 9-11 was God's judgment on America for it's sinfulness. Such statements are, for the most part, rightly renounced by the public. The key fallacy behind such statements is that they arrogantly presume to know God's will.

I stumbled on an old article by N.T. Wright yesterday on postmodernity and the proposed response for the church. As usual his Biblical scholarship is exquisite. He goes over the story of Christ visiting the disciples in Luke after his death and breaking bread with them before vanishing. He tells it with "musical accompaniment" from one of the Psalms. He goes on to describe the moment when the disciples realize who Christ is and their eyes become open, and juxtaposes it with a moment in Genesis after the fall when Adam and Eve's eyes become closed. All quite brilliant stuff.

What does any of that have to do with postmodernity and how we should respond to it? I'm not quite sure. He makes some allusions to how the two connect, but honestly it seems like he should have separated this into two different articles. The opening and closing of this piece are on postmodernity and the church, while the center is a piece of Biblical scholarship that seems to me mostly disconnected from the introduction and the conclusion. It's possible I'm just being obtuse but, in any case, I didn't really follow him here.

What struck me as particularly odd was Wright's claim that postmodernity is an outworking of God's judgment on the arrogance of modernity. How is such a claim, where Wright claims to know the will of God and claims that a particular event is the result of his judgment, fundamentally different from the types of statements made by Falwell and Robertson? My assertion is that there is no difference. Wright's claim is more cerebral and abstract, and it doesn't cynically play on tragedy, but the key fallacy is identical. Even if Wright were as visible a public figure as the other two, undoubtedly his statement would not strike people as being offensive because, again, it's more cerebral (a lot fewer people would even know what he's talking about), and because in this example Wright is claiming an extremely broad, general judgment that applies to the whole of mankind. Where Falwell and Robertson's statements claimed to know when God was judging specific sub-sets of humanity. Nevertheless, the underlying fallacy is the same.

As a second, mostly unrelated point, Wright's acceptance of postmodernity itself seems to be made on grounds that appear to be quite modern. His entire method of critique that he employs for evaluating postmodernity--wherein he concludes that we should not fear it but embrace it--is itself based in wholly modern epistemology. For example, he states with a great deal of certitude that "what we must not do, I believe, is pretend [postmodernity] hasn't really happened." But, if postmodernity does in fact hold sway, then there's really nothing that we must not do. Indeed, such a claim belongs to the arrogance of modernity which he has already renounced.

Wright goes on to assert that there are "no such thing as bare facts", and that postmodernity has revealed this to be the case. In other words he claims that it's a fact that there are no facts.

Directly after stating that postmodernity has undermined the validity of all "metanarratives", revealing them to be mere power games, he proceeds to introduce a coherent, linear metanarrative of his own which culminates in his revealing postmodernity to be a judgment upon mankind, and he expects us to accept his own metanarrative as valid and important.

Such is the absurdity of postmodernity.

I suppose within the nihilistic constructs of postmodernity you can create metanarratives while simultaneously denouncing metanarratives as inherently meaningless. You can make heavy-handed pronouncements about things that we "must" do, while simultaneously asserting that postmodernity has revealed that we need not do anything in particular. You can reject the arrogance of modernity while arrogantly, modern-ly asserting that modernity is dead, and that it's death is the result of God's judgment.