On Godwin's Law

If you frequent online message boards or social media, you may have encountered something known as Godwin's Law. The 'Law' officially states that 'As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1.' This aspect of the 'Law' is pretty uncontroversial, but in practice the 'Law' is invoked in some circles any time a comparison to Hitler or Nazi Germany is made -- many of which are legitimate -- with the invoker of the Law claiming that the invoker of Hitler has lost simply by making the comparison. Godwin himself says that this is not the intent of the law, and admits that such a move is often fallacious. Rather his intent in formulating such a 'Law' is to get "folks who glibly compared someone else to Hitler or to Nazis to think a bit harder about the Holocaust." In other words, he wants to discourage lightly making such serious comparisons when they often are not appropriate and to foster an environment where such analogies are made much less regularly.

The problem -- with both over-eager Godwin's-Law-invokers and Godwin's goal itself -- is that the seeming surfeit of Hitler and Nazi analogies in the marketplace of ideas are not purely a product of a general lack of circumspection about the gravity of the Holocaust (though some of that exists), but are very often an appropriate, necessary feature of rational thought. And not only within the narrow band of exceptions explicitly carved out by Godwin for comparing similarly genocidal or totalitarian actions to the Nazis.

The Most Extreme X, for any given category or subject, is always a useful referent for the logician. Any time someone makes categorical or absolute claims about any subject, appealing to The Most Extreme X within that field can often immediately refute their claim. For example, if someone says "It is never morally permissible to lie", the most popular refutation by way of anecdote appeals to the Most Extreme Circumstance in the field of morally permissible lying, and it's almost always the case of hiding Jews in your house with Nazi SS at the door interrogating you. This is a completely legitimate and logical move, and its intent isn't to tar anyone with guilt by association. So the fact that this example is invoked over and over again is a good thing, contrary to Godwin's desire to see the use of such analogies decrease.

And this isn't the only situation where such a move is called for and appropriate. The examples are virtually innumerable. Consider someone making a defense of democracy as an inherent good, without qualification. Once again, the rigorous logician is immediately compelled to point out that Hitler rose to power via democratic institutions of government. And again, this sort of move is nothing like the glib, dismissive sort of analogy where someone compares one person who did something mildly bad to Hitler, who also did something bad. Yet the Godwin-Law-invokers will pipe up with their facile objections just the same.

Godwin's Law isn't an actual law, of course, and it was formulated in an at least partially frivolous and sarcastic way, so a serious response to the phenomenon on my behalf may seem disproportionate or silly. But it really does injure legitimate discourse and gives shelter to faulty, irrational dogmas, if it is taken even semi-seriously, which it often is.

Abolished Man

After watching this excellent lecture on Biblical eschatology by Father Thomas Hopko, in which he declares that The Abolition of Man by C.S. Lewis is the best book of the last century at least, I decided to re-read it. It's a short volume of reflections on the state of modern man and the consequences of an utterly reductionistic dismantling of everything fundamentally human, from values to reason. Lewis' musings are highly relevant in our increasingly postmodern culture, and his decrying of "innovators" and "Conditioners" brings to mind various public figures in academia and politics.

The one that most clearly sprung to mind for me is Sam Harris, and especially his book The Moral Landscape. Harris is a perfectly distilled example of the naivete and folly that Lewis describes. Harris -- as with many modern men -- wants to use reason so as to see through the foundations of reason, and to appeal to some 'value' that is more fundamental than any of those values that we sentimental humans inherit from our forebears. But, as Lewis says:

This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgments. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. Therefore never has been, and never will be, a radically new judgment of value in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) 'ideologies,' all consist of fragments of the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. If my duty to my parents is a superstition, then so is my duty to posterity. If justice is a superstition, then so is my duty to my country or my race. If the pursuit of scientific knowledge is a real value, then so is conjugal fidelity. The rebellion of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if the rebels could succeed they would find that they had destroyed themselves. The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in.

Harris does imagine himself -- or at least the scientific community writ large -- to be capable of just such a feat. But his rather large book -- whose basic premise is that it is possible to derive a system of morality from an empirical investigation of nature and application of reason -- all hinges on a single un-reasoned-for, un-empirical assumption. At the root of Harris' system, the ground basis for it, is that the maximal flourishing and well-being of conscious creatures is desirable and should be pursued, and the the worst possible misery for conscious creatures is undesirable and should be avoided. This is somewhat uncontroversial, in itself, and isn't necessarily a problem provided that one is willing to admit that one is appealing to a principle outside of the bounds of reason or empiricism, to what Lewis refers to as the Tao. But it is precisely this that Harris can never admit, given his worldview as a materialist, and given that his entire project purports to be the unsullied deliverance of disinterested reason and empirical investigation.

At any rate, a systematic debunking of the naive positivism of Harris is beyond the realm of this post and superfluous. But the manner that Lewis lays bare the conceits of such men -- effortlessly navigating and giving felicitous expression to philosophical ideas about the nature of man -- is impressive. Harris is a potent example of such a man, but he's far from unique as such men are now everywhere occupying positions of influence and power. Lewis was perspicacious on this count.

It isn't the love of reason (to the extent that it's present), or the value of skepticism that Lewis is putting on trial, as he recognizes the great value of both. But Lewis knows that the achilles heal of the rigorous, thorough, devout skeptic is all too often, ironically, his insufficient skepticism:

Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process.

Harris and his ilk don't misstep by appealing to certain First Principles. Indeed, if they wish to reason about morality (or anything else) they can hardly do otherwise, as Lewis clearly sees. It is in denying that they are doing so that they err. But does Harris really believe that there is, or can be, such a thing as a neutral, or assumption-less ground for reason or morality? You would not think such a thing possible for an educated person, but I recently read Harris' short e-book Lying, and a passage in it seems to confirm just that:

Like many of Kant’s philosophical views, his position on lying [that it was wrong in all cases] was not so much argued for as presumed, like a religious precept.

Although this is a dubious reading of Kant, the salient point is that the very notion of First Principles appears to scandalize Harris. As if he had reasoned for his moral system at every juncture, all the way down, including at its starting point, rather than presuming that flourishing is desirable and misery is undesirable "like a religious precept." His skepticism is sufficient to question Kant and his First Principles, but apparently such skepticism is inapplicable to Sam Harris and his.

Opposing Gay Marriage is Loving

Having been inspired by Leroy Huizenga's recent piece at First Things, titled Opposing Gay Marriage is Rational, Not Religious, I want to contribute something along that same trajectory.

Proponents of gay marriage (or, more accurately, opponents of traditional marriage) often claim that there can be no rational argument against gay "marriage". Hence, Huizenga's volley (as well as those of others such as Francis Beckwith and Robert P. George) is significant and relevant. Opponents of traditional marriage also very often lay claim to a monopoly on love and compassion on this issue. Even though they themselves may not be gay, they so deeply and intensely care for the "rights" of others that they take a stand for gay "marriage". So, not only do they have a monopoly on moral reasoning, they also have a monopoly on compassion and empathy.

But just as opponents of traditional marriage don't actually have a monopoly on reason, despite their claims, neither do they have a monopoly on loving, compassionate other-centeredness. Indeed, the group who stands to be most directly, adversely affected by gay "marriage" is gay people themselves and so it is an act of Christian charity and love to oppose gay "marriage". And, conversely, those who are adamant about their moral support of their gay brethren are actually showing flagrant disregard for their well-being.

Before I defend the claim that gays stand to lose the most in legalizing gay "marriage", and that it's an act of love toward the LGBT community to oppose it, let me first clarify that just because this is at bottom a loving act, that doesn't mean it will always be undertaken in a loving way. Sacrificially serving others is also fundamentally an act of love, but if it's done begrudgingly or with a spiteful heart then the love is lost. Similarly, if the act of opposing gay marriage is done with a haughty or selfish heart, then the loving character of the act disappears. I have no intention of defending Christians who speak the ostensible truth but fail to do so in love, because Jesus says that they are anathema (essentially). My argument is against those who say that it's not possible to speak the truth in love -- that is, those actively supporting gay marriage in the public square, while denouncing the opposition as necessarily bigoted or hateful or irrational -- because that is also an affront to God.

Those who object to my argument would undoubtedly throw anecdotes my way of un-Christian non-love that have taken place in this battle (some real and most fiction), but I'm preemptively halting any such objections because the topic at hand is the nature of the act itself, at root, which is distinct from the question of how the act is being carried out. Though I will also say that, while there are obviously many ways Christians can go about their defense of traditional marriage wrongly and unlovingly, the vast majority of wrongs that are attributed to Christians on this issue aren't actually wrongs at all. Such as standing up for their beliefs by eating at Chick Fil-A and taking pictures of it, which is a perfectly legitimate, loving action. Beckwith makes that last point most clearly and strongly, arguing that it is absolutely an act of love between brothers in Christ and completely Christ-like. But my argument (which shall now commence) goes a step further and claims that it's also an act of love toward the LGBT community itself.

It's a simple observation, but the only proper telos for human sexuality, as created by God, is within the covenant of marriage, which appears throughout the Bible as a heterosexual union at all junctures, without exception. The verses that specifically condemn homosexuality -- which many, on both sides, curiously seem to haggle over quite a bit -- are actually mostly superfluous to the debate as the positive Biblical vision of marriage -- what it is, represents, entails and means -- necessarily precludes gay "marriage" from ever being a good thing.

Of course, even among Christians -- who should all affirm the preceding paragraph without hesitation -- some will object that they only think it should be a legal right in a free society, not that they are affirming gay marriages as good. It is only the right to do whatever we want that is good! While this is a highly dubious move -- dependent as it is on a vision of The Good which Christians are under no obligation to acknowledge or recognize, and which is actually heretical -- even if we grant it for sake of argument, it still doesn't address whether the act of legalizing something which affirms someone in their sin is helpful or harmful to that person. The Christian who cleaves to this position -- who holds that gay "marriage" is an affront to God's vision of marriage, but that it should still be legal -- is in favor of society not only tolerating sin, but affirming it positively. That Christian is helping the sinner to sin, shepherding them toward death, coaxing them along the path to damnation, and claiming that it is worth the trade because, hey, at least they can affirm the secular, liberal state's understanding of "freedom" along the way. This is obviously an untenable position.

Conversely, when we use the instrument of the modern state to reflect God's Law, the law becomes a signpost to the Law, and it performs the same function as signpost. Namely: it shows us our radical fallenness and need for radical Grace. While Grace has arrived, Law is still a perpetual movement in the story of God's love, and it's our duty as expositors of that story to not leave it out in the name of some bland "tolerance". Hence, when we refuse to leave it out -- such as when we oppose gay marriage -- we are loving our neighbors to the utmost.

What about those Christians who don't believe that gay "marriage" is an affront to God's vision of marriage? They speak manifest nonsense, rubbish, and gibberish, and in so doing slander the divine. Anathematize accordingly.