Why do secular champions of modernity feel the need to fabricate false histories in order to depict Christianity as especially brutal, intolerant or anti-intellectual? You would think that in the history of Christendom there are plenty of legitimately objectionable occurences to decry without making stuff up. A few months ago David B. Hart wrote a brilliant piece in response to the release of Alejandro Amenábar's Rachel-Weisz-starring film Agora in which Christians are depicted as particularly intolerant, brute savages who were opposed to the advancements of Greek science on philosophical grounds, and for that reason murdered the secular, Greek scientist-philosopher Hypatia and destroyed the Great Library of Alexandria. Hart goes on to point out that this 'history' is an utterly fabricated narrative with virtually no foundation in any evidence whatsoever. And, in fact, the evidence that there is paints an entirely different picture altogether.
The key points being that while Christians did in fact murder Hypatia, it wasn't because of her intellectual, scientific pursuits (which were also engaged in by Christians and which Christians did not object to), but because of her role in a political dispute in the city. Of course this doesn't make the act any less heinous or objectionable, but it does refute the narrative context of the supposed reasons for their actions. That is to say; it wasn't their Christianity (clearly), or their hatred of secular science that drove these people to such lengths, but rather specific local, political conflicts of the sort that have occured since the beginning of time, and have been engaged in by people of all faiths and those of no faith. Anyways, Hart's piece describes all of this much more fully and ably, so read that.
Of course it seems Amenábar's film specifically is likely the result of inertia; a facile acceptance of poor history. The interesting, broader theme is the stake that the champions of modernity, of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, have in pitting the 'light' of secular science, knowledge and progress against the 'darkness' of intolerant, ignorant and violent 'faith'. That is, how this narrative ever was introduced and widely accepted uncritically to begin with. Especially by focusing on an era of history where such an opposition was completely unknown. Where pagans, Jews and Christians did science and philosophy side by side. It's an anachronism based on the decidedly modern 'conflict' between the two--though that too is often largely exaggerated or fabricated.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Monday, August 16, 2010
The Social Benefits of Evil
The Non-Problem of Evil
In philosophical discussions on the existence God the issue of the 'problem of Evil' often arises. When it does it is most often presented as a challenge to the believer, usually in the form of something along the lines of 'if God is all-powerful and all-loving, then why does suffering exist?' The implication being that if God were all-powerful and all-loving he would necessarily see to it that suffering was eradicated from this existence.
I don't see any reason that this should be the case. Clearly this argument presumes to know what God knows (which we don't know), and presumes that the optimal world is necessarily one where no suffering is permitted to exist. There simply exists no reason to believe that this is the case, given our limited human knowledge. Perhaps, for all we know, the salvation of a single human, through an act of his own will, is a good that outweighs every ounce of suffering and evil that has ever occurred. We don't have the means of adjudicating God's righteousness, so 'the problem of Evil' for the believer is no problem at all. At least not in the sense of being a legitimate objection to the merits of the Christian faith. Evil is, of course, a problem in another sense. That being that it is, well, evil, and as such is the enemy of God. But this is not what is meant by 'the problem of Evil' when brought up by skeptics and critics of faith.
The real question seems to be how does the the materialist, the rational scientific modernist, the secularist account for the existence of evil? And, if they recognize its existence at all, what means do they have for addressing that problem?
Like the Christian the committed nihilist is faced with no real problem. 'Evil' is merely a human delusion, just like 'goodness', 'truth' and 'justice'. So the nihilist seems to be off the hook. However, very few non-believers are avowed nihilists, and even some of the ones who claim to be hold beliefs and values that run contrary to their nihilism. But for the true nihilist 'Evil' is easily and fully explicable.
Thus it seems that the 'problem of evil' is really only a 'problem' for one specific group of people: atheists who affirm the existence of virtues, vices, rights, wrongs, good, evil, oughts and ought nots. They must account for how anything could possibly be evil (or 'good') rather than just be. One would think that after Nietzsche rightly deduced that nihilism is the logical consequence of atheism over a century ago moralizing atheists would be in the minority. It turns out this is not the case. Most atheists exist in just this state of flagrant, unreflective self-contradiction. Very few heartily embrace all the consequences of their unbelief. Others at least attempt to address the problem by accounting for 'the problem of Evil' on materialist grounds.
So how does the strict materialist account for the existence of 'evil'? They recognize evil to be real, they simply define it as aberrant behavior from particular socio-biological, mutual-benefit norms that have arisen in nature. That is to say that they believe that we, highly evolved primates that we are, don't murder each other as a norm because we realize that if we murder someone, someone could then justify killing us. So in our own self-interest we make decisions that will more likely be beneficial for ourselves individually, and then for our tribe, and then for our species. These social norms and aberrations somewhere along the line became our 'morality', which was then codified in various tracts of religion. So then, the materialist has accounted for 'evil'. 'Evil' is: individuals who behave in unfashionable, socially unacceptable ways. The ultimate 'evil' in a materialist calculus appears to be akin to being a geek in high school.
Clearly this distinction is meaningless and the materialist has no means by which to construct a system of ethics or morality that aren't ultimately wholly arbitrary. For a moment let us ignore the inherent vapidity of the materialist account of evil and grant their social conception of it. If 'evil' is a collection of aberrations to social norms then what is 'good'? Society itself, of course. Which is the history of the 20th century, as a response to this conception of good and evil; Totalitarianism, Marxism, Communism and various social utopianisms attempting to fashion society to their various whims, at any cost--including the cost of the sanctity of human life. Society owes no allegiance to individual human life, society exists only to serve itself and its own ends, whatever they may be. Society itself is the end game. And, working within this framework, this is the exactly correct, logical conclusion to draw.
Which is not to say that other worldly systems of belief are not without their own flaws. Certainly not. As much as we cherish our liberal democracy our ultimate 'good' is really pure, unadulterated choice. While freedom is certainly something worth defending and a solid foundation for a system of government, in itself it is not an ultimate good because it includes the freedom to make poor decisions. And often it includes the freedom of insulation from criticism of poor choices. However, this democratic notion of society supports other important, legitimate values, such as the value of each individual, justice and charity. While the social utopianisms squelch such notions, and impose hierarchal structures of worth on society. The state itself is the ultimate end and not the individuals who comprise it.
Defensible Genocide
Genocide can have demonstrable, obvious social benefits for those members of society who aren't themselves exterminated. For example, if there is a shortage of food or housing and you murder 10% of the population there should be a certain amount of higher available resources for there are fewer people consuming things, and whatever the dead had possessed now get distributed to their families which increase their own situation in life. If the genocide is of, say, the elderly or newborns then their deaths will also lighten financial and other types of burdens on their families. Not to mention that if the genocide is of those with 'inferior' genome sequences, then the remaining members of society will have better genes and thus be more suitable for all survival, procreation and societal functions.
Perhaps some materialist moral utilitarians would object on the grounds that those benefits derived are not worth the cost of human lives taken. Not to mention the psychological costs incurred by the family members of the dead. Even if they agreed fully that the act would be a boon to themselves in terms of their own comfort, and of remaining society at large, most would still prefer that such a vile and wicked act not take place. But such an objection--while certainly understandable given the outcries from a God-authored conscience--is not rational given the framework it is working within. Which is to say that utilitarianism makes no sense within a materialist framework. Clearly nature doesn't strive to make everyone happy all--or even most--of the time, and if we can only construct our morality as a reflection of our material, social 'nature' as is, then happiness can not be the point. Propagation of the species is the point. Society is the point.
Advocates of abortion often turn to evidences of the social benefits of abortion in order to attempt to justify the practice. Some such evidences are real, others are fiction. But even if 100% of the supposed social benefits were real and legitimate, the abortion advocate often proceeds completely unaware that one could advance the exact same argument in favor of infanticide, or really of any kind of genocide. Clearly the relevant issue is at what point an embryo constitutes a human life--if we believe in the sanctity of human life--but the fact that many abortion advocates feel that their strongest argument is a social one reveals the vapidity of that argument. Either social ends can be a legitimate justification of mass murder or they can not. If you don't believe that abortion constitutes murder, then you should make that argument and realize that the social benefits are entirely irrelevant even if you can prove that they exist.
Whether an act of genocide produces a net social benefit or a net social loss is immaterial when we recognize the sanctity of each individual human life. The sanctity of human life takes precedence over any particular social outcomes or configurations that we might desire. So even if the defense of life yielded particularly dire consequences for society, life still must be defended, because an individual's right to life trumps society's 'right' to construct itself as it sees fit. This seems obvious and intuitively true. Indeed, the vast majority of atheists would agree with this assertion when presented in such a way, or they implicitly affirm it in the way they live and the values that they actually hold. The problem for them is that they have no means for affirming the sanctity of life. Clearly 'nature' does not recognize the sanctity of human life, as death and extinction are the rule rather than the exception in nature. And if nature does not affirm it then neither can the atheist because nature is all that there is, and it is from nature that we must derive our 'morality', in their view.
Conclusion
It seems peculiar then that so many atheists should feebly cling to notions of the sanctity of human life, the value of the individual, justice and so on and so forth, while they recklessly attempt to undermine the foundations of all such notions. Society as an end in itself, the devaluation of humanity and the individual, nihilism; these are the proper, logical ends of a materialist scientific rationalism. Either embrace them or reject them. But if you reject them, realize that the alternative--the sanctity of human life, the value of the individual, equality, justice; the goods of compassion, charity and love; the evils of collectivism, hatred and murder--can only be properly understood and accounted for within a (minimally) theistic worldview. Realize that you are not only rejecting God but you are rejecting all of the associated concepts, values and ideals that were birthed and given meaning through a particular theistic worldview. Realize that you are, in fact, rejecting the sanctity of human life and the value of the individual as mere human delusions. Realize it and trumpet it proudly. Or realize that there are very good reasons that you aren't rejecting all of these things, even though such rejections are logical corollaries of your unbelief.
In philosophical discussions on the existence God the issue of the 'problem of Evil' often arises. When it does it is most often presented as a challenge to the believer, usually in the form of something along the lines of 'if God is all-powerful and all-loving, then why does suffering exist?' The implication being that if God were all-powerful and all-loving he would necessarily see to it that suffering was eradicated from this existence.
I don't see any reason that this should be the case. Clearly this argument presumes to know what God knows (which we don't know), and presumes that the optimal world is necessarily one where no suffering is permitted to exist. There simply exists no reason to believe that this is the case, given our limited human knowledge. Perhaps, for all we know, the salvation of a single human, through an act of his own will, is a good that outweighs every ounce of suffering and evil that has ever occurred. We don't have the means of adjudicating God's righteousness, so 'the problem of Evil' for the believer is no problem at all. At least not in the sense of being a legitimate objection to the merits of the Christian faith. Evil is, of course, a problem in another sense. That being that it is, well, evil, and as such is the enemy of God. But this is not what is meant by 'the problem of Evil' when brought up by skeptics and critics of faith.
The real question seems to be how does the the materialist, the rational scientific modernist, the secularist account for the existence of evil? And, if they recognize its existence at all, what means do they have for addressing that problem?
Like the Christian the committed nihilist is faced with no real problem. 'Evil' is merely a human delusion, just like 'goodness', 'truth' and 'justice'. So the nihilist seems to be off the hook. However, very few non-believers are avowed nihilists, and even some of the ones who claim to be hold beliefs and values that run contrary to their nihilism. But for the true nihilist 'Evil' is easily and fully explicable.
Thus it seems that the 'problem of evil' is really only a 'problem' for one specific group of people: atheists who affirm the existence of virtues, vices, rights, wrongs, good, evil, oughts and ought nots. They must account for how anything could possibly be evil (or 'good') rather than just be. One would think that after Nietzsche rightly deduced that nihilism is the logical consequence of atheism over a century ago moralizing atheists would be in the minority. It turns out this is not the case. Most atheists exist in just this state of flagrant, unreflective self-contradiction. Very few heartily embrace all the consequences of their unbelief. Others at least attempt to address the problem by accounting for 'the problem of Evil' on materialist grounds.
So how does the strict materialist account for the existence of 'evil'? They recognize evil to be real, they simply define it as aberrant behavior from particular socio-biological, mutual-benefit norms that have arisen in nature. That is to say that they believe that we, highly evolved primates that we are, don't murder each other as a norm because we realize that if we murder someone, someone could then justify killing us. So in our own self-interest we make decisions that will more likely be beneficial for ourselves individually, and then for our tribe, and then for our species. These social norms and aberrations somewhere along the line became our 'morality', which was then codified in various tracts of religion. So then, the materialist has accounted for 'evil'. 'Evil' is: individuals who behave in unfashionable, socially unacceptable ways. The ultimate 'evil' in a materialist calculus appears to be akin to being a geek in high school.
Clearly this distinction is meaningless and the materialist has no means by which to construct a system of ethics or morality that aren't ultimately wholly arbitrary. For a moment let us ignore the inherent vapidity of the materialist account of evil and grant their social conception of it. If 'evil' is a collection of aberrations to social norms then what is 'good'? Society itself, of course. Which is the history of the 20th century, as a response to this conception of good and evil; Totalitarianism, Marxism, Communism and various social utopianisms attempting to fashion society to their various whims, at any cost--including the cost of the sanctity of human life. Society owes no allegiance to individual human life, society exists only to serve itself and its own ends, whatever they may be. Society itself is the end game. And, working within this framework, this is the exactly correct, logical conclusion to draw.
Which is not to say that other worldly systems of belief are not without their own flaws. Certainly not. As much as we cherish our liberal democracy our ultimate 'good' is really pure, unadulterated choice. While freedom is certainly something worth defending and a solid foundation for a system of government, in itself it is not an ultimate good because it includes the freedom to make poor decisions. And often it includes the freedom of insulation from criticism of poor choices. However, this democratic notion of society supports other important, legitimate values, such as the value of each individual, justice and charity. While the social utopianisms squelch such notions, and impose hierarchal structures of worth on society. The state itself is the ultimate end and not the individuals who comprise it.
Defensible Genocide
Genocide can have demonstrable, obvious social benefits for those members of society who aren't themselves exterminated. For example, if there is a shortage of food or housing and you murder 10% of the population there should be a certain amount of higher available resources for there are fewer people consuming things, and whatever the dead had possessed now get distributed to their families which increase their own situation in life. If the genocide is of, say, the elderly or newborns then their deaths will also lighten financial and other types of burdens on their families. Not to mention that if the genocide is of those with 'inferior' genome sequences, then the remaining members of society will have better genes and thus be more suitable for all survival, procreation and societal functions.
Perhaps some materialist moral utilitarians would object on the grounds that those benefits derived are not worth the cost of human lives taken. Not to mention the psychological costs incurred by the family members of the dead. Even if they agreed fully that the act would be a boon to themselves in terms of their own comfort, and of remaining society at large, most would still prefer that such a vile and wicked act not take place. But such an objection--while certainly understandable given the outcries from a God-authored conscience--is not rational given the framework it is working within. Which is to say that utilitarianism makes no sense within a materialist framework. Clearly nature doesn't strive to make everyone happy all--or even most--of the time, and if we can only construct our morality as a reflection of our material, social 'nature' as is, then happiness can not be the point. Propagation of the species is the point. Society is the point.
Advocates of abortion often turn to evidences of the social benefits of abortion in order to attempt to justify the practice. Some such evidences are real, others are fiction. But even if 100% of the supposed social benefits were real and legitimate, the abortion advocate often proceeds completely unaware that one could advance the exact same argument in favor of infanticide, or really of any kind of genocide. Clearly the relevant issue is at what point an embryo constitutes a human life--if we believe in the sanctity of human life--but the fact that many abortion advocates feel that their strongest argument is a social one reveals the vapidity of that argument. Either social ends can be a legitimate justification of mass murder or they can not. If you don't believe that abortion constitutes murder, then you should make that argument and realize that the social benefits are entirely irrelevant even if you can prove that they exist.
Whether an act of genocide produces a net social benefit or a net social loss is immaterial when we recognize the sanctity of each individual human life. The sanctity of human life takes precedence over any particular social outcomes or configurations that we might desire. So even if the defense of life yielded particularly dire consequences for society, life still must be defended, because an individual's right to life trumps society's 'right' to construct itself as it sees fit. This seems obvious and intuitively true. Indeed, the vast majority of atheists would agree with this assertion when presented in such a way, or they implicitly affirm it in the way they live and the values that they actually hold. The problem for them is that they have no means for affirming the sanctity of life. Clearly 'nature' does not recognize the sanctity of human life, as death and extinction are the rule rather than the exception in nature. And if nature does not affirm it then neither can the atheist because nature is all that there is, and it is from nature that we must derive our 'morality', in their view.
Conclusion
It seems peculiar then that so many atheists should feebly cling to notions of the sanctity of human life, the value of the individual, justice and so on and so forth, while they recklessly attempt to undermine the foundations of all such notions. Society as an end in itself, the devaluation of humanity and the individual, nihilism; these are the proper, logical ends of a materialist scientific rationalism. Either embrace them or reject them. But if you reject them, realize that the alternative--the sanctity of human life, the value of the individual, equality, justice; the goods of compassion, charity and love; the evils of collectivism, hatred and murder--can only be properly understood and accounted for within a (minimally) theistic worldview. Realize that you are not only rejecting God but you are rejecting all of the associated concepts, values and ideals that were birthed and given meaning through a particular theistic worldview. Realize that you are, in fact, rejecting the sanctity of human life and the value of the individual as mere human delusions. Realize it and trumpet it proudly. Or realize that there are very good reasons that you aren't rejecting all of these things, even though such rejections are logical corollaries of your unbelief.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Opposition That Defines Us
"Defining yourself in opposition to something is still being anaclitic on that thing, isn't it?" - David Foster Wallace
Recently I was skimming through highlighted passages of my copy of Infinite Jest and I came across this gem. At first blush--or at least once you've looked up the definition of 'anaclitic'--this seems to make a lot of sense intuitively. We can all instantly think of examples of particular types of people who do this. Reflecting on the concept a little more though, it's surprising just how pervasive a phenomena that this turns out to be. There seems to be a strong, though unhealthy, tendency in all of us to do this, at least on some level.
Some, of course, have a stronger inclination than others, and it's only in these extreme manifestations that the truth of Wallace's statement becomes most glaring. One of the best examples that leapt nimbly to mind was that of so-called 'Black leaders'. They primarily position themselves as vehemently opposed to all forms of racism and 'social injustice'. Certainly such a motivation is quite noble, and should be commended. Undoubtedly many such leaders are quite sincere in their desire to help victims of racism when they first begin their careers. But ultimately what seems to happen is that, in positioning themselves as against something rather than for something, their existence becomes defined and justified through the very racism that they decry. Indeed, their entire careers become dependent on the continued existence of that which they are supposedly fighting against.
In his biting satirical novel Black No More George Schuyler writes scathingly about 'black leaders' and 'race activists'.
While reading this I instantly thought of the likes of Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, Tim Wise and various other race-baiters of contemporary American culture, but this is certainly not a new phenomenon. Black No More was written in 1931.
In his essay titled Five Gospels But No Gospel N.T. Wright takes on the Jesus Seminar, questioning their historical methodology and presuppositions. He sees evidence in their work, specifically in their book titled The Five Gospels, that they presuppose a picture of Jesus, a picture that is fundamentally un-fundamentalist, and then attempt to fit historical interpretations of the words and life of Jesus into that picture. In setting themselves as diametrically opposed to Christian fundamentalism, the Seminar ends up guilty of its own brand of fundamentalism. Wright writes:
Of course one can think of many other examples of people defining themselves in opposition to something, and therefore becoming themselves depedent on that very thing. There are people who make a career of being an atheist, writing polemical anti-God articles, essays and books. The irony being that, if they were ever to succeed in convincing all people to renounce belief in God, they would in turn eliminate the need for their writings. The disillusioned, aging, hippy Vietnam War protestor with nothing left to rally against. The political hack who never fails to define his own position on an issue as the inverse of the opposing party's position, without any intellectually principled foundation. The serial protestor who will leap to the picket lines on behalf of anyone or anything without hesitation or reflection. The examples are endless, and even if not manifested in such extremes, we likely can recognize some tendencies of our own to define ourselves via the negation of something else.
The reason we do this also seems to be fairly obvious, and it's found in Newtonian physics. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Which is to say if racism is a strong force in your environment, then your opposition will need to be equally strong, and, even when that opposition is appropriate, it can engulf you in an unhealthy way. If fundamentalism was pushed on you with forcefulness, then your negative reaction to it will be equally strong, and in that push you are in danger of pushing right past objectivity. Also it's just much easier to point out the flaws of a another person or position than to advance a positive case for something that we believe in.
Recently I was skimming through highlighted passages of my copy of Infinite Jest and I came across this gem. At first blush--or at least once you've looked up the definition of 'anaclitic'--this seems to make a lot of sense intuitively. We can all instantly think of examples of particular types of people who do this. Reflecting on the concept a little more though, it's surprising just how pervasive a phenomena that this turns out to be. There seems to be a strong, though unhealthy, tendency in all of us to do this, at least on some level.
Some, of course, have a stronger inclination than others, and it's only in these extreme manifestations that the truth of Wallace's statement becomes most glaring. One of the best examples that leapt nimbly to mind was that of so-called 'Black leaders'. They primarily position themselves as vehemently opposed to all forms of racism and 'social injustice'. Certainly such a motivation is quite noble, and should be commended. Undoubtedly many such leaders are quite sincere in their desire to help victims of racism when they first begin their careers. But ultimately what seems to happen is that, in positioning themselves as against something rather than for something, their existence becomes defined and justified through the very racism that they decry. Indeed, their entire careers become dependent on the continued existence of that which they are supposedly fighting against.
In his biting satirical novel Black No More George Schuyler writes scathingly about 'black leaders' and 'race activists'.
While the large staff of officials was eager to end all oppression and persecution of the Negro, they were never so happy and excited as when a Negro was barred from a theater or fried to a crisp. Then they would leap for telephones, grab telegraph pads and yell for stenographers; smiling through their simulated indignation at the spectacle of another reason for their continued existence and appeals for funds.
While reading this I instantly thought of the likes of Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, Tim Wise and various other race-baiters of contemporary American culture, but this is certainly not a new phenomenon. Black No More was written in 1931.
In his essay titled Five Gospels But No Gospel N.T. Wright takes on the Jesus Seminar, questioning their historical methodology and presuppositions. He sees evidence in their work, specifically in their book titled The Five Gospels, that they presuppose a picture of Jesus, a picture that is fundamentally un-fundamentalist, and then attempt to fit historical interpretations of the words and life of Jesus into that picture. In setting themselves as diametrically opposed to Christian fundamentalism, the Seminar ends up guilty of its own brand of fundamentalism. Wright writes:
Frankly, both the desire to "prove" orthodoxy and the desire to "disprove" it ought to be anathema to the serious historian. The first of these is, of course, the way to what is normally called fundamentalism; the second, taken by at least some (and they are clearly influential) in the Jesus Seminar, is no less closed-minded, and in fact fundamentalist, in practice. Hatred of orthodoxy is just as unhistorical a starting point as love of it.
Of course one can think of many other examples of people defining themselves in opposition to something, and therefore becoming themselves depedent on that very thing. There are people who make a career of being an atheist, writing polemical anti-God articles, essays and books. The irony being that, if they were ever to succeed in convincing all people to renounce belief in God, they would in turn eliminate the need for their writings. The disillusioned, aging, hippy Vietnam War protestor with nothing left to rally against. The political hack who never fails to define his own position on an issue as the inverse of the opposing party's position, without any intellectually principled foundation. The serial protestor who will leap to the picket lines on behalf of anyone or anything without hesitation or reflection. The examples are endless, and even if not manifested in such extremes, we likely can recognize some tendencies of our own to define ourselves via the negation of something else.
The reason we do this also seems to be fairly obvious, and it's found in Newtonian physics. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Which is to say if racism is a strong force in your environment, then your opposition will need to be equally strong, and, even when that opposition is appropriate, it can engulf you in an unhealthy way. If fundamentalism was pushed on you with forcefulness, then your negative reaction to it will be equally strong, and in that push you are in danger of pushing right past objectivity. Also it's just much easier to point out the flaws of a another person or position than to advance a positive case for something that we believe in.
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